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Abstract 
  In this dissertation three essays on corporate governance and politically connected firms 
are presented. The first essay “Interlocked Boards of Directors, Corporate Governance and 
Earnings Quality” studies the effects of interlocked boards of directors on voluntary governance 
disclosures, governance practices and earnings quality. The Canadian environment, where 
director interlocks are prevalent, is examined. A checklist of twenty voluntary disclosure 
measures from proxy statements is developed and a direct measure of interlocking directorships 
is employed. It is found that interlocked boards of directors are negatively associated with 
voluntary governance disclosures and positively associated with earnings quality. From an 
accounting perspective, greater earnings quality provides evidence that regulator rules and 
policies limiting interlocks may be unnecessary. 
  Research has shown that firms can benefit when they are politically connected. The 
extant literature has shown that politically connected firms benefit from procurement contracts, 
reduced regulatory issues and lower costs of capital. However, with more politicians joining 
corporate boards, the effect of political connectedness on corporate governance remains unclear. 
The second essay is entitled “Politically Connected Directors and Corporate Governance”, and it 
examines the association between politically connected directors and corporate governance. A 
sample of high ranking politicians that have joined firm boards of directors is examined. I find 
that firms with politician directors have higher corporate governance scores. Additional tests also 
indicate that an addition of a politician to a board of directors increases the governance quality. 
  The extant literature has also demonstrated that both political connections and cross-
listing can benefit firms in various aspects, such as superior stock returns and a lower cost of 
capital. The third paper, entitled “The Value of Political Connections for Cross-Listed Firms”, 
examines whether cross-listed firms can obtain incremental financial benefits by also being 
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politically connected. 142 Canadian cross-listed firms are examined to determine the extent of 
their political connections and to assess whether any incremental benefits are gained in 
politically connected cross-listed firms. The results show that politically connected cross-listed 
firms have higher analyst following, higher market valuations and greater market liquidity. 
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Chapter 1:  
 
Introduction  
 
 The following chapters in this dissertation present three essays on corporate governance 
and politically connected firms. Although these are designed as three separate business studies, 
common themes appear throughout. The importance of board membership is featured in all of 
the essays. The board of directors are vital to corporations as they are tasked with a fiduciary 
duty and have several important responsibilities including monitoring, controlling, hiring and 
firing management, as well as setting the firm’s governance policies (Cadbury, 1992; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Essays one and two focus on corporate governance. Several corporate governance 
scandals in the past couple of decades have brought this issue to the forefront—especially with 
many of them involving accounting fraud. Essays one and three examine the Canadian business 
environment- which remains one of the largest economies in the world. Finally, both essays two 
and three look at politically connected firms. The importance of political connections in business 
has been recognized for many years and still benefits many firms today (Faccio, 2006). 
  The first essay examines interlocked boards of directors and drawing upon agency, full 
disclosure and alignment effect theories, it studies the relationship between interlocked boards 
and corporate governance and earnings quality. The second essay continues the work of recent 
literature on retired politicians joining corporate boards. It takes a resource dependence view and 
asks whether these politically connected firms are associated with higher quality corporate 
governance and whether politicians improve the corporate governance quality of such firms. The 
third essay combines the academic literatures of politically connected firms and cross-listed 
firms and examines whether cross-listed firms also benefit from being politically connected. It 
utilizes three common measures of political connections in determining whether these 
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connections enhance the benefits firms obtain from cross-listing. 
  Key insights found in this dissertation include: 1) interlocked board of directors are 
positively associated with earnings quality, but negatively associated with governance 
disclosures; 2) firms with politicians on the board of directors improve their corporate 
governance quality; and 3) Firms which are both cross-listed firms and politically connected 
benefit through higher analyst following, higher market valuations, greater market liquidity, and 
are more likely to receive procurement contracts than non-connected cross-listed firms. 
  Each essay presents an introduction, an overview of the related literature, hypotheses or 
research question development, the methodology employed, the empirical results, additional 
testing performed, and a conclusion. 
 
References  
 
Cadbury, A. (1992). Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance. 
London: Gee & Co. 
 
Faccio, M. (2006). Politically connected firms. American Economic Review, 96 (1), 369-386. 
 
Fama, E.F., & Jensen, M.C. (1983). The separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law 
and Economics, 26 (2), 301-325. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the effects of interlocked boards of directors on voluntary governance 
disclosures, governance practices and earnings quality. The Canadian environment, where 
director interlocks are prevalent, is examined. A checklist of twenty voluntary disclosure 
measures from proxy statements is developed and a direct measure of interlocking directorships 
is employed. I find that interlocked boards of directors are negatively associated with voluntary 
governance disclosures and positively associated with earnings quality. From an accounting 
perspective, greater earnings quality provides evidence that regulator rules and policies limiting 
interlocks may be unnecessary.  
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1. Introduction 
  Within the emergence of corporate governance research in the late twentieth century, one 
of the most controversial topics has been interlocking directors (Cai et al., 2014; Davis, 1996). A 
board interlock is defined as sharing a common member on respective boards of directors or as a 
circumstance in which a person affiliated with one organization sits on the board of directors of 
another organization (Mizruchi, 1996; Reppenhagen, 2010). Interlocking directorships have been 
prevalent for many years and are formed for various reasons; however, the literature has 
remained divided on the impact of board interlocks. Critics argue that boards with interlocks 
serve as ineffective internal control mechanisms that impair independence and lead to biased 
decision making. Supporters counter that interlocks allow firms to hire more desirable directors 
and privately facilitate the exchange of information. While directors undoubtedly play a vital role 
in organizations (Fama & Jensen, 1983), studies have found both positive and negative 
performance and governance effects resulting from interlocking boards (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; 
Brown, 2011; Erickson et al., 2006; Klein, 2002). This study investigates whether and how 
director interlocks are associated with governance and/or accounting quality; specifically I 
examine voluntary governance disclosures and earnings quality. By focusing on these outcomes, 
the study aspires to present evidence informing whether rules and policies limiting interlocks are 
necessary. 
  Corporate governance and director interlocks vary by country. Researchers have looked 
at the effects of board interlocks in various countries, although the unique Canadian environment 
has not been extensively studied. This study examines the Canadian capital market—where 
various types of board interlocks have long been prevalent (Baginski et al., 2002), corporate 
governance disclosures have mainly been voluntary and International Financial Reporting 
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Standards (IFRS) have allowed for flexibility in financial reporting. This allows for testing in an 
institutional environment where directors can have significant influence over a firm’s 
governance and financial reporting practices. 
  The literature regarding voluntary disclosures has shown mostly positive benefits from 
increasing the level of disclosure (e.g. Botosan, 1997).
1
 While interlocked boards have been 
found to exercise wider accounting discretion (Bowen et al., 2008), the impact to governance 
disclosures and earnings quality from interlocks has not been extensively investigated. The 
orientation of disclosures is significantly influenced by the cultural environment in which 
companies operate (Gray, 1988). In Canada, the extent of voluntary governance disclosures and 
earnings quality varies widely among corporations. Although firms’ disclosure choices are often 
sticky over time (Healy et al., 1999), interlocked directors serve as conduits for information that 
can lead to changes in corporate disclosure policies (Cai et al, 2014). Moreover, interlocked 
directors may have a self-serving interest that could be exploited through the management of 
earnings and corporate governance practices. 
  To study the effects of how the corporate interlock structure relates to accounting quality, 
a proxy disclosure score of voluntary governance disclosures is developed based on guidelines 
from the Canadian Coalition of Good Governance. Additionally, accrual models are employed to 
proxy for earnings quality. Results using a measure of direct interlocks show a negative 
relationship between board interlocks and governance disclosures and a positive relationship 
between board interlocks and earnings quality. Supplemental analysis demonstrates that there is 
no association between board interlocks and simple or basic voluntary disclosures (items that 
only deal with disclosures in the proxy statements), but there is a strong negative relationship 
between board interlocks and corporate governance (policies and practices) disclosures. 
                                                          
1
 There are also many costs to increasing the level of disclosure, such as the risk of losing proprietary information. 
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  Using an alternative proxy of governance quality, Globe and Mail governance scores, I 
also find a negative relationship with board interlocks. However, firms headquartered in the two 
largest provinces, Ontario and Quebec, seem to be driving the results. Busy boards are shown to 
have a positive relationship with governance disclosure, but not necessarily with earnings 
quality. Consistent with previous research, the results also show that a strong relationship exists 
between an independent chairperson and a high level of disclosures.  
 This paper contributes to the extant literature by examining both the negative and positive 
effects of interlocked boards of directors. Although recommendations to reduce board interlocks 
have been presented in prior research, these proposals have not always been empirically 
supported. Consistent with the literature regarding directors sitting on multiple boards (Byrd, et 
al., 2010; Ferris, et al., 2003), interlocked board members may have a positive effect on the 
performance of a firm. The paradox of director interlocks providing fewer voluntary disclosures, 
but enhanced earnings quality, can best be explained by extending alignment effect theory. 
Alignment effect theory (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) predicts that 
concentrations create incentives to report high quality earnings, as the close groups have 
incentives to keep earnings management within proper bounds. Thus, as interlocked directors are 
almost always reciprocal shareholders, interlocked firms are more likely to have longer term 
incentives and sufficient monitoring, but low motivation to disclose proprietary information. 
This study differs from other studies in the area, such a Chiu et al. (2013). In this paper accrual 
models are used rather than restatements for earnings management and a direct measure of 
interlocks is employed, rather than common directors. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section presents relevant 
information regarding boards of directors and director interlocks. Section three provides further 
8 
 
relevant literature and proposes research hypotheses. Section four describes the research 
methodology. The results are reported in section five. Supplemental analysis is shown in section 
six. The final section of the paper discusses the findings of the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Board of Directors and Director Interlocks 
  A great deal of research and regulation has focused on boards of directors, as they play a 
vital role in monitoring management and reducing agency conflicts (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Directors are vital to an organization as they are responsible for setting an ethical tone for the 
company; directors also monitor, select, retain and discipline top management as well as 
protecting the organization’s assets (Schwartz et al., 2005). Interlocking boards of directors have 
been prevalent for the last century‒since the creation of modern organizations (Dooley, 1969). A 
board interlock is defined as multiple organizations sharing common members on respective 
boards of directors (Reppenhagen, 2010). Mizruchi and Stearns’ (1988) work finds that there are 
three main reasons for the formation of director interlocks: (i) cooptation and monitoring; (ii) 
collusion; (iii) legitimacy, career advancement and social cohesion. Interlocking directorates 
occur regularly across industries and often mobilize a scarce resource in the expertise of senior 
managers and directors of large corporations (Fich & White, 2005). This practice is legal, but 
often raises questions regarding the quality and independence of board decisions. Nonetheless, 
research has produced conflicting and inconclusive results concerning the effects of interlocks. 
  While researchers and North American regulators generally contend that multiple outside 
directorships constitute a form of managerial opportunism, recent literature has generally found 
that directors that who on multiple boards are positively related to the long-term performance of 
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a firm (Byrd et al., 2010; Ferris et al., 2003; Geletkanycz & Boyd, 2011). Indeed, firms tend to 
hire high profile directors as a signalling mechanism to the market (Deutsch & Ross, 2003). 
Board interlocks also allow firms to observe the behavior of other firms as well as reduce 
uncertainty associated with strategic initiatives that they undertake (Borgatti & Foster, 2003).
2
 
Conversely, several studies have found that the presence of interlocked directors is indicative of 
weak governance and that inadequately comprised boards can have negative consequences such 
as groupthink and bullying (Fich & Shivdasani, 2007; Maharaj, 2008). Furthermore, there are 
significant reputational penalties not only for firms accused of fraudulent financial reporting, but 
also for firms that are linked through a board interlock (Kang, 2008). Likewise, the results are 
mixed when examining the performance effects of interlocks. For instance, firms that have 
interlocking directorships are significantly more likely to receive private equity offers (Stuart & 
Yim, 2010).
3
 Meanwhile, Devos et al. (2009) document that director interlocks lead to lower 
than optimal sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.  
International Perspective  
Pederson and Thomsen (1997) find that governance models (including board structures) are 
developed by historical waves of nationalization and privatization, industry structure and 
countries' attractiveness as recipients of foreign direct investment. Furthermore, first mover 
industrial countries have less government ownership, while late movers in industrialization have 
industrial policies aimed at catching up with government ownership of strategic industries. 
Corporate governance varies across jurisdictions and director interlock studies from different 
countries have produced results that have seen both benefits and drawbacks of interlocks. For 
                                                          
2
 Communication of successful strategies through director interlocks often allows firm managers to imitate the 
activities of other firms to which they are tied (Haunschild, 1993). 
3
 The study finds that firms that have directors with private equity deal exposure gained from interlocking 
directorships are significantly more likely to receive private equity offers. Private equity offers benefit firms in 
various ways such as raising the market value of the target firm. 
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instance, in European countries such as Germany, Belgium, and Austria, a two-board system is 
employed. In this model, one board is made up of company executives, who generally run day-
to-day operations, while the supervisory board, consisting of non-executive directors who 
represent shareholders and employees, monitor the executive board, determine executive 
compensation, and review major business decisions (Stokman et al., 1985).  
  Researchers have found that board interlocks around the world produce varied effects on 
an organization. In a Malaysian study, the presence of a limited number of interlocked directors 
on a board provided an incentive for diligent monitoring as they have the knowledge, expertise, 
skill and incentive to actively monitor the actions of management (Hasim & Rahman, 2011). 
Similarly, a Columbian study found a positive relation between both the ratio of outside directors 
and the degree of board interlock, with firm return on assets (Pombo & Gutiérrez, 2011). In 
contrast, Santella et al. (2009) find that large corporations (“blue chips”) in Italy, Germany and 
France are linked to each other through a small number of interlocking directors who serve on 
several company boards at the same time, allowing the corporations to operate under covert 
mutual scrutiny. Moreover, Italian corporations have been found to use board interlocks for 
collusive purposes (Drago et al., 2011). Finally, other more neutral (networking) effects have 
also been found. For example, Davison et al. (1984) find that in Australia there is a significant 
relationship between the number of director interlocks and the probability that interlocked 
companies are audited by the same public accounting firm. In summary, board interlocks have 
developed in varying ways internationally, with the research showing positive, negative and 
neutral effects across jurisdictions.  
 
3. Canadian Setting and Hypotheses Development 
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  Similar to the United States, Canada’s legal system, with the notable exception of 
Quebec
4
, is based on British Common law, which is known to have the strongest investor 
protection (La Porta et al., 1998). Leuz et al. (2003) finds that Canada ranks high on legal 
enforcement of commercial law and low on the prevalence of earnings management. 
Furthermore, Canada is known to have relatively weak creditor rights, compared to other 
industrialized countries, such as Germany or Japan (La Porta et al., 1998). Thus, banks play a 
“relatively weak” role in influencing corporate governance mechanism in the country and often 
do not have significant equity in medium and large capital firms (La Port et al., 1999). 
  The Canadian regulatory environment is ideal for the study of corporate governance, 
interlocked boards of directors and accounting quality for a variety of reasons. Historically, 
directors of Canadian corporations have not been the subject of intense scrutiny and more board 
interlocks have been prevalent than in the United States (Baginski et al., 2002). As well, 
corporate governance disclosures and practices are mainly voluntary.
5
 Similarly, the shift to 
International Financial Reporting Standards has provided more flexibility in financial reporting. 
Moreover, Canada is unique in that it has no federal regulatory agency, but rather multiple 
provincial regulators.
6
 Although these provincial agencies and the Canadian Security 
Administration have worked together towards relatively uniform standards, timely responses are 
often lacking for emerging issues.
7
 
  Canada is also known to have a large number of family and closely controlled 
                                                          
4
 The province of Quebec operates under French Civil law, which has weaker investor protection. 
5 
It can be classified as a comply-or-explain regime, where firms either voluntary comply with regulator’s 
recommendation or explain why they do not comply (MacAulay et al., 2009). 
6 In 2011, a proposed Canadian Securities Act would have established a national regulator. However, it was rejected 
by the Supreme Court of Canada. 
7 
For example, in 2013, the Canadian Security Administration released Paper 54-401: Review of the Proxy Voting 
Infrastructure. This was after similar reports were issued in the United Kingdom (2007), Australia (2008) and the 
United States (2010). 
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corporations (Smith & Amoako-Adu, 1999).
8
 When family ownership is highly concentrated, the 
firm tends to lose value and experience governance failures (Silvia & Majluf, 2008). 
Furthermore, Richardson (1987) finds that in the Canadian environment the least profitable 
nonfinancial corporations tend to be negatively affected by director interlocks.  
  With securities scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, YBM Magnex International and 
Livent, pressure to improve governance practices, such as more effective boards of directors, has 
influenced the Canadian market. According to Shipilov et al. (2010), as part of a trend to 
improve corporate governance practices, board reforms spread through large Canadian 
organizations between 1999 and 2005. This wave of board reforms emphasized increased board 
independence, separating the CEO and board chairperson positions, and full independence of a 
board’s audit and compensation committees. With the introductions of Bill 198 in 2003, 
Canada’s answer to Sarbanes Oxley (SOX), directors have been discouraged from sitting on too 
many boards and governance scores have increased (MacAulay et al., 2009). While regulations 
recommend that Canadian corporations have a majority of independent directors (a minimum of 
three independent directors are needed for the audit committee), there still tends to be a “cozy-
ness” in Canadian corporate governance and proxy battles are unusual (McMillan Binch LLP, 
2004). Nonetheless, compared to regulatory environments with more stringent reporting 
standards, interlocked directors in Canada may have the incentives and opportunities to manage 
corporate governance information and allow firms to manage earnings. 
  Institutional investors are also active in the Canadian environment and can influence 
governance policies. Dedicated institutional investors, who hold more concentrated portfolios 
with low turnover, may have the incentives to invest in monitoring management and thus 
influence corporate governance. On the other hand, transient investors, who hold stocks for 
                                                          
8
 For example Bombardier, McCain, Rogers and Saputo to name a few. 
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trading purposes, may influence management to engage in less conservative financial reporting 
practices (Lin, 2016). Activist institutional investors attempt to influence various aspects of 
corporate governance by private discussions with management and through shareholder 
proposals (Kahan & Rock, 2007). As well, institutional investors in Canada occasionally go to 
regulatory authorities to challenge board decisions and processes (McMillan Binch LLP, 2004). 
Governance Disclosure Level 
  The benefits of voluntary disclosures have been well documented in accounting research. 
Lower cost of capital and increased market liquidity are the main reasons for a firm to 
voluntarily disclosure additional information (Botosan, 1997; Verrecchia, 1990). On the other 
hand, there are several indirect costs of voluntary disclosure, such as revealing information to 
competitors, unions and regulators, as well as litigation risks (Bozec et al., 2004; Dye, 1986). 
The orientation of disclosures is significantly influenced by the cultural environment in which 
companies operate (Gray, 1988). In Canada, the extent of voluntary disclosures varies widely 
among corporations (Bujaki & McConomy, 2002). 
  There are several reasons why management and directors may want to increase the extent 
of voluntary disclosures, including governance based disclosures. Decreasing information 
symmetry via disclosures decreases the cost of external financing and capital and decreases the 
likelihood of a firm’s undervaluation. This in turn should reward management (and directors) 
with increased stock compensation (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Additionally, a firm may be 
motivated to voluntarily disclose information in order to increase analyst coverage and signal 
management talent (Graham et al., 2005). Both of these reasons would benefit executives 
involved with interlocked directorships. 
 Although not extensively utilized in the literature, a company’s management information 
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circulars (hereafter known as proxy statements) are the primary communication link with the 
board of directors for most shareholders (Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, 2012). 
Important information, such as interlocked boards of directors, director engagement and 
shareholder engagement, is often only found in a firm’s proxy statements. Furthermore, as shown 
in the literature review, corporate governance disclosure standards change frequently, often on a 
yearly basis in Canada (Shipilov et al., 2010). 
 Accurate and complete disclosures are an external control mechanism that reduces firm 
costs and are fundamental for a number of stakeholders including analysts and investors. The 
monitoring function of corporate governance significantly influences the propensity for better 
disclosure practices (Elshandidy & Neri, 2015). Further, board interlocks create a network 
structure that influences board-level decisions through the sharing of knowledge and 
experiences, which includes best disclosure policies (Cai et al., 2014; Shropshire, 2010).  
   Voluntary information disclosures are also driven by a cost-benefit trade-off between 
proprietary cost concerns and market valuation benefits (Verrecchia, 1983). Additionally, while 
the quality of its voluntary disclosures is influenced by a firm’s governance (Eng & Mak, 2003), 
boards with less independent non-executive directors are negatively associated with 
comprehensive disclosures (Chen & Jaggi, 2000). Therefore, consistent with recent studies 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012), where director interlocks are often perceived negatively, there 
could very well be a limit to the optimal level of governance disclosure for such firms.  
  Discretionary governance disclosures may be withheld by a firm due to the negative 
associations found with interlocked boards of directors. For instance, interlocked boards 
contribute to higher CEO compensation across industries (Hallock, 1997). Brown (2011) finds 
that board interlocks increase the likelihood of a firm adopting tax or corporate-owned life 
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insurance shelters. Finally, compensation-based incentive to commit financial accounting fraud, 
such as backdating of stock options, are positively related to interlocked boards (Bizjak et al., 
2009; Erickson et al., 2006). Although a firm’s disclosure choices are often sticky over time 
(Healy et al., 1999), Cai et al. (2014) argue that interlocked directors serve as conduits for 
information that leads to changes in corporate practices and disclosure policies. Furthermore, 
voluntary governance disclosures provide information directly related to directors’ biographies 
as well as the practices and policies for which they are responsible. Thus, interlocked boards may 
have a self-serving interest to manage which pieces of information are disclosed. Specifically, 
interlocked directors may manage information related to corporate governance. Thus, the first set 
of hypotheses are formed:  
  H1a: Agency argument, there is a negative relationship between interlocking  
  directorships and the level of voluntary governance disclosures 
 H1b: Full disclosure argument, there is a positive relationship between interlocking  
  directorships and the level of voluntary governance disclosures 
Earnings Quality 
  Earnings quality generally refers to how reasonable and sustainable is the net income of 
an organization (Dechow & Dichev, 2002). Analogous with voluntary disclosures, firms have 
choices on which accounting methods and policies to use from a mandatory set (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990). Management may have an incentive to manipulate the accounting numbers 
depending on the firm’s debt/equity ratio or to obtain an optimal bonus, among other motivations 
(Healy, 1985; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). Klein (2002) finds that reductions in board 
independence are associated with lower earnings quality. Using restatements as a proxy for 
earnings management, Chiu et al. (2013) find that fraudulent accounting practices spread to firms 
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through interlocked boards of directors. They also argue that interlocked directors can transfer 
different kinds of knowledge about earnings management to board-linked firms. This could lead 
to a “hierarchical agency” problem where there are not only conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders, but also conflicts of interest between the board and the shareholders 
(Cyert et al., 2002). Accordingly, if there is moral hazard inherent in interlocked directors 
(including an asymmetric information advantage over other directors), then earnings 
management may be employed as a mechanism to extract private benefits (e.g. higher 
compensation, more lucrative appointments). 
  On the other hand, alignment effect theory (Demsetz & Lehn 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1986) states that corporate structures may vary systematically (via ownership concentration, 
management, directors), but do so in order to maximize firm value. Wang (2006) shows that the 
alignment effects motivate family firms to report earnings of higher quality than nonfamily 
firms. Although interlocked directors are not “family”, they are by definition a concentrated 
group, and should have incentives to effectively monitor management.
9
 If directors have an 
inherent interest in the firm (above the legal requirements) then this could improve their 
stewardship role in mitigating information asymmetry. Moreover, Bowen et al. (2008) 
demonstrates that poor governance practices (such as interlocks) do not necessarily lead to 
earnings management or poorer firm performance. Additionally, Hasim and Rahman, (2011) find 
that directors with multiple appointments (busy directors) can result in higher earnings quality. 
Thus, interlocked directors, which are often considered independent and often have a reputation 
to maintain, should have an incentive to curb managerial opportunism.  Therefore, the second set 
of hypotheses follows: 
                                                          
9
 Alignment effect theory is not exclusive to family firms. For example, other studies have shown an alignment 
effect in global management (Singh et al., 2011) and equity compensation (Devers et al., 2008). 
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  H2a:   Agency argument, there is a negative relationship between interlocking  
  directorships and earnings quality 
 H2b:   Alignment effect argument, there is a positive relationship between interlocking  
  directorships and earnings quality 
 
4. Design and Method 
 Canadian firms have mandatory information that they need to disclose in proxy 
statements, such as the nominated directors and executive compensation. However, there are 
many quantitative and qualitative items that are optional. For instance, visual aids, details 
regarding board interlocks and director succession plans are not required, but are often included. 
Following the work of several researchers (Botosan, 1997; Francis, et al., 2005; Xiao & Yuan, 
2007), a checklist of voluntarily disclosure proxy statement items (as discussed below) named 
the PDScore was developed. The items included in the checklist, as well as the scoring, can be 
found in Table 1. While other indices focus on other corporate governance elements, such as 
board composition or shareholder rights
10
, this checklist deals mainly with voluntary governance 
disclosures in the proxy statements. 
  All of the items in the checklist were developed from the Canadian Coalition for Good 
Governance’s (CCGG) 2011 Best Practices for Proxy Circular Disclosures.11 The Canadian 
Coalition for Good Governance believes that good governance practices contribute to a 
company's ability to create value for its shareholders. Its members include institutional investors 
that manage approximately $3 trillion in assets on behalf of pension funds, mutual funds and 
                                                          
10
 For instance, Gompers et al.’s (2003) Governance Index, Brown and Caylor (2006) Gov-Score Index, and 
Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) Entrenchment Index. 
11
The Canadian Coalition for Good Governance is a leading non-profit organization/market leader in governance 
practices. In several proxy statements examined, firms with a commitment to good governance follow its practices 
and/or have its directors meet with the organization to improve its governance. 
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other investors. The CCGG states that, “(due to) the cumbersome nature of many regulatory 
filings and the degree of expertise required to understand (...) disclosures can often be greatly 
improved through the use of plain language.” (Canadian Coalition for Good Governance, 2012).  
Thus, disclosures should be easy to find, easy to understand and provided in context so the 
information is meaningful. Furthermore, the CCGG provides recommendations for which 
governance guidelines should be voluntarily disclosed. This includes, but is not limited to, 
director independence, director interlocks, skills of the board, committees of the board and 
shareholder engagement. 
  The checklist employed in this study takes twenty of the most prominent and quantifiable 
guidelines and develops a score out of twenty. These guidelines from the CCGG tend to be 
above the minimum requirements of the TSX. Each proxy is thoroughly analyzed to determine 
whether the underlying guideline has been disclosed, with a score of either one or zero given.
12
 
Appendix I provides examples of illustrative disclosures. The raw score is then divided by 
twenty for the regressions. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
  Interlocks have been measured through various methods in the literature. Fich and White 
(2005), in their study of CEO interlocks, define director interlocks as reciprocal or mutually 
interlocking relationships‒when directors serve together on at least two boards of two different 
corporations. This is consistent with the definition of regulators and firms in this study, “an 
interlock occurs when two or more board members are also board members of another public 
company” (Bank of Montreal, 2011). Figure 1 visually displays the difference between the direct 
Interlock variable and what is not considered an interlocking relationship in this study. 
                                                          
12
Although there is a degree of subjectivity involved, the author applied a consistent approach to all the proxy 
statements examined. Further, strong internal consistency was found within industries. 
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 The study gathers data regarding directorships from a sample of 120 Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) medium and large cap listed firms during the 2011 fiscal year. Due to data 
availability for Canadian firms, the sixty firms from the S&P/TSX 60 are chosen along with a 
random sample of sixty firms. The starting point was the 60 S&P/TSX 60, which represents a 
portfolio index of leading Canadian companies in leading industries. The sample was then 
expanded to include an additional 60 firms from the S&P/TSX 300 (12 firms from the additional 
sample dropped due to insufficient data and replaced). Data is obtained from COMPUSTAT, the 
System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) and the System for Electronic 
Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI). The following model is employed to test H1: 
 
 PDScorei = α0 + α1Interlocki + α2BusyDIRi + α3Sizei + α4BoardSizei + α5INDChairi    
        + α6Leveragei + α7BKMKi + α8YoungCEOi + α9OldCEOi + α10CEOTenurei  
       + α11Cross-Listedi + α12Institutionali + α13-16Industryi + μ           Eqn. (1) 
 In the above model, Interlock is a dummy variable with a value of one if there was a 
director interlock and zero otherwise. The paper controls for other factors that may influence 
disclosure quality: Busy directors, BusyDIR, is calculated as the number of other directorships 
board members hold, scaled by board size (Ferris et al., 2003). Firm size is controlled for, as it is 
positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure in many jurisdictions (Chow & Wong-
Boren, 1987; Hossain, et al., 1994). Size is measured using the natural log of the total assets of a 
corporation. Board size has been found to be positively correlated with firm value and the market 
responds favorably to board size increases, while unfavorably to large board size decreases 
(Larmou & Vafeas, 2010). However, an increase in multiple directors often reduces corporate 
disclosure (Eng & Mak, 2003). BoardSize is measured as the total number of directors on board. 
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The corporate governance literature suggests that when the CEO or another executive is also the 
chairperson of the board, often too much power is obtained, which leads to an agency problem 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Therefore, INDChair is a dummy variable with a value of one if there 
was an independent chair and zero otherwise. Leverage is measured as a firm’s total debt divided 
by its total assets. Book-to-market (BKMK) is calculated as the book value of equity, excluding 
preferred shares, divided by the market value of the firm on the balance sheet date. CEO age and 
CEO tenure have been found to be associated with performance, ethics and financial quality 
(Dikolli et al., 2014; Huang et al., 2012). Thus, as the literature has found significant differences 
between younger and older CEOs, YoungCEO is an indicator variable if the CEO is under the 
age of fifty, OldCEO is an indicator variable if the CEO is sixty or older and CEOTenure 
measures the number of years in that position. Cross-listed is an indicator variable if the firm is 
listed in the United States. Institutional is a dummy variable with a value of one if the firm was 
owned by an eligible institutional investor and zero otherwise. Finally, as firms often follow the 
voluntary disclosure trends of their industry, Industry dummy variables have been added to 
control for any inter-industry differences. Industry2, Industry3, Industry4 and Industry5 
correspond to their two-digit NAICS codes of 21- 23, 31-33, 42-48 and 51-54 respectively, as 
shown in Table 2, Panel B. A value of one is given if the company is in the specific industry, 
with a value of zero otherwise. The data is then winsorized for all non-dummy control variables 
at the 1% and 99% levels. Appendix II provides a list of all the variables. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 The modified Jones model as set forth by Dechow et al. (1995), commonly used in 
accounting research, is employed to determine whether companies with interlocking directors 
have lower earnings quality. Total accruals are regressed as: 
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  TA = α1(1/Ait-1) + α2 (∆REVit  -∆RECit) + α3(PPEit) + μ             Eqn. (2) 
 
where 
TA= total accruals scaled by total assets at t-1 
∆REVt  = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1, scaled by total assets at t-1 
∆RECt  = net receivables in year t less net receivables in year t-1, scaled by total assets at t-1 
PPEt = gross property, plant and equipment in year t, scaled by total assets at t-1 
At-1 = total assets at t-1  
α1, α2, α3 = firm specific parameters 
μ = the residual 
   Discretionary accruals (DA) for each firm i in each industry are defined as the difference 
between the total accruals (TA) and the fitted value of equation (2), as follows: 
 
  DAit = |TA – [â1 (1/A it-1) + â2 (ΔREVit – ΔRECit) + â3(PPEit) |              Eqn. (3) 
 
where 
 
DA= discretionary accruals for company i at time t 
 
  A higher amount of discretionary accruals indicates lower quality earnings. The 
preceding cross-sectional regression is performed for the industry groups in NAICS 21- 23, 31-
33 and 42-48. Since a higher amount of discretionary accruals indicates lower quality earnings, 
Earnings Quality (EQ) is then measured as DA multiplied by negative one. 
 To test the second hypothesis, a similar regression is run: 
 
   EQi = α0 + α1Interlocki + α2BusyDIRi + α3Sizei + α4BoardSizei + α5INDChairi +    
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              α6Leveragei + α7BKMKi + α8YoungCEOi + α9OldCEOi + α10CEOTenurei +  
    α11FemaleDIRi + α12Cross-listedi + α13PDScore + α14NetLoss  
    + α15-17Industryi + μ                        Eqn. (4) 
  The model is similar to Eqn. (1), as the earnings quality literature in accounting often 
uses similar variables as disclosures for controls, such as Size, Leverage and BKMK. Similarly, 
many papers control for other governance variables when attempting to isolate a corporate 
governance effect. Thus, INDChair, YoungCEO, OldCEO, and CEOTenure are kept in the 
model, along with the PDScore (for examples of these standard controls and governance controls 
used in the literature see: Burnett et al., 2015; Chiu et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2012; Nelson & Devi, 
2013; Wang, 2006 and Xie et al., 2003). Women on the board of directors have been shown to be 
linked with more conservative practices, such as a lower likelihood of fraud (i.e. Abbott et al., 
2012). Thus, FemaleDIR measures the percentage of females on the board. Firms with negative 
net income are more likely to have lower earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010). NetLoss is a 
dummy variable with a value of one if the firm had a net loss in the year and zero otherwise. As 
the modified Jones model is not applicable to financial firms, Industry5 is eliminated from the 
equation.
13
 Similarly, the three corporations labeled as utilities and three firms in other industries 
have been removed from this test for the same reason. A description of the samples selected for 
both hypotheses is shown in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5. Results 
Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
  Table 3, Panels A and B, shows the current number of director interlocks of the sample of 
                                                          
13
 A majority of the firms in the NAICS 51-54 sample were financial organizations. 
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120 medium and large cap firms listed on the TSX. Data was obtained from 2011-2012 proxy 
statements. Canadian organizations have an average of almost one interlocked directorship on 
each board of directors. The energy, materials and financial industries (or mining, utilities and 
construction & information, financial, insurance, real estate, management and professional 
services industries via the NAICS codes) have the highest concentration of interlocked 
directorships. While the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States 
decrees that a non-independent director cannot serve on an interlocked board of directors in the 
same industry (Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, 2012), the findings reveal that there is a presence 
of non-independent board members among the sample that serve on an interlocked directorship 
in the same industry.
14
 
 Descriptive statistics for the sample are shown in Table 4. The financial numbers were 
obtained using COMPUSTAT for 88 of the firms. The data for the other firms, which was not 
available on COMPUSTAT, were obtained from annual reports on SEDAR. Information on 
institutional investors was obtained from SEDI.
15
 Corporations with an interlocked board of 
directors are larger on average than non-interlocked corporations, especially in regards to total 
assets (p-value < 0.05), as well as total PPE and Sales (p-value < 0.10). Interlocked firms also 
have significantly higher book-to-market ratios. This could imply that investors perceive 
interlocked boards of directors as being a negative factor and incorporate this information into 
their stock valuations. Interlocked firms also tend to have a larger board size and be more 
leveraged. Non-interlocked firms have shorter CEO tenures (by over two years) and have a 
significantly higher percentage of female directors. There is no significant difference between 
                                                          
14
 Although not specifically looked for in the sample, at least a half dozen non-independent board members have 
interlocking directorships in the same two-digit NAICS code. 
15
 In 2011, owners with a 10% or greater shareholding were required to be identified. 
24 
 
interlocked and non-interlocked firms on the PDScore. However, interlocked firms do have 
significantly lower discretionary accruals across all industries. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 Table 5 shows the summary statistics for the mean PDScores. The effectiveness of the 
compensation program/historical compensation had the highest score with 95% of the firms 
disclosing this information. This is most likely attributed to the large amount of executive 
compensation data that is required to be disclosed—often taking up close to half the proxy 
statements examined. On the other hand, only 53% of firms examined included a compensation-
performance linkage chart, which is seen as a higher level of voluntary disclosure. Attendance of 
committee meetings is usually detailed, nominee profiles including share and option ownership, 
board self-assessment and table of contents or other organizing mechanism scored the next 
highest, respectively. These disclosures have become common in proxies and are relatively easy 
to disclose. A policy limiting interlocks and a table clearly showing independence with non-
independence explained, seen as high level good governance by the CCGG, are the least likely to 
be voluntarily disclosed. Among alternative explanations, this could suggest that many of the 
corporations do not believe that interlocks and independence are materially important. 
  Not surprisingly, non-interlocked firms were significantly more likely to disclose a policy 
limiting interlocks as well as to reveal director succession plans (both significance at p-value < 
0.05). However, interlocked firms were significantly more likely to have independence policies, 
disclosed detailed attendance of committee meetings and include a directors’ skills matrix (p-
value < 0.01). Additionally, interlocked firms were more likely to disclose information regarding 
nominee profiles showing share and option ownership data (p-value < 0.05). 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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  Table 6 and Table 7 displays Pearson-Spearman correlation of variables matrixes for 
proxy disclosure scores and earnings quality, respectively. As expected, size and independent 
chair are both significantly positively correlated with PDScore, while CEO Tenure is 
significantly negatively correlated with PDScore. Size and Board Size are positively correlated 
over 0.50 in both the Pearson and Spearman correlations. Multicollinearity is addressed in 
Section 6. Earnings Quality (EQ) is significantly negatively correlated with NetLoss firms, which 
is hardly surprising. The relationships between both PDScore and EQ with Interlock is positive, 
but not at significant levels. Size and book-to-market are significantly correlated with Interlock, 
while CEO tenure and female directors’ percentage are negatively correlated with Interlock.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
Multivariate results 
  The results of the OLS regression for voluntary disclosures are shown in Table 8. The 
main test variable, director Interlock, is found to have a significant negative association with 
voluntary governance disclosures on a two-tailed t-test. This provides support for the agency 
argument (H1a) at 0.04, which states that interlock directors may have an incentive to withhold 
information.  
  There is a strong negative relation between PDScore and OldCEO (supported at 0.02). 
This is consistent with the notion that older CEOs are associated with lower disclosure quality. 
The results also indicate that there are positive associations between both firm Size and 
INDChair with the PDScore (supported at < 0.01). The positive coefficient of independent chair 
is consistent with prior research that finds having an independent chairperson improves corporate 
governance practices. BusyDIR are found to have a positive association with the governance 
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disclosures (supported at 0.03), consistent with research on multiple boards that busy directors 
can have positive effects on a firm. Moreover, Board Size, Leverage, BKMK, CEOTenure, 
YoungCEO, Cross-listed, Institutional are all insignificant in the model. Thus, when other 
characteristics of good governance are controlled for, there is no longer an insignificant 
difference between the interlocked and non-interlocked firms.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
  The results of the OLS regression for earnings quality are shown in Table 9. Interlock 
firms have greater earnings quality. This provides support for the alignment effect argument 
(H2b), supported at 0.06. The only control variable to have a significant effect is NetLoss, which 
is significantly associated with lower earnings quality (higher discretionary accruals), as has 
been shown in the extant literature. All of the other control variables are insignificant in the 
model. 
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
 
6. Supplementary Analysis 
Additional Testing 
  As an alternative to the checklist method for testing H1, the Globe and Mail/Report on 
Business Board Games 2011 governance ratings are utilized. These governance rankings, 
perhaps the most widely known in Canada, rank major corporations on best corporate 
governance practices annually. The Board Games methodology and scoring for 2011 are: board 
composition (out of 31), shareholder rights (out of 31), shareholding and compensation (out of 
26) and disclosure (out of 12). Although not a direct substitute for voluntary governance 
disclosures, it is still predicted to have the same relationship with interlocking directors. Table 10 
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shows the Pearson-Spearman correlations between PDScore with GlobeScore and the Globe sub-
categories. PDScore and GlobeScore are significantly correlated (p-value < 0.01) at 0.72 and 
0.73 in the respective correlation results. Additionally, PDScore is significantly correlated with 
all the Globe sub-categories. Next, GlobeScore is substituted for PDScore as follows: 
 
GlobeScorei = α0 + α1Interlocki + α2BusyDIRi + α3Sizei + α4BoardSizei + α5INDChairi    
        + α6Leveragei + α7BKMKi + α8YoungCEOi + α9OldCEOi + α10CEOTenurei  
       + α11Cross-Listedi + α12Institutionali + α13-16Industryi + μ           Eqn. (5) 
 Table 11 shows the results from the Globe and Mail governance scores regressions. Firms 
from the proxy disclosure sample that were not included in the Board Games scoring list were 
dropped. In the first column, the test is run with the full score out of 100. Since board 
composition is endogenous with Interlock and other variables in the model, the board 
composition category is dropped and scored out of 69 in the second column. The coefficient on 
Interlock, similar to the PDScore, is negatively and significantly associated with GlobeScore in 
both of the columns. In fact, the significant level of the first GlobeScore regression show a 
stronger negative relationship with Interlock (supported at 0.03) than the main regression- this is 
explored further in the sensitivity analysis. Also noted is that BusyDIR is not significant in this 
model.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 With each province having its own corporate rules and regulations, corporate interests 
have distinctively multi-jurisdictional models of corporate governance (Gray, 2010). Table 12 
reruns the PDScore regressions by province to determine whether there are any provincial effects 
28 
 
on Interlock with the PDScore. The provinces with the most observations—Alberta, Ontario and 
Quebec— along with all the other provinces combined are examined. Results show that firms 
headquartered in Ontario and Quebec (60% of the sample) are strongly driving the negative 
Interlock-PDScore association. This is consistent with the notion that Quebec’s civil law 
provides weaker investor protection. There is no significant effect found for Alberta firms, but 
consistent (albeit not significant) results for the group of other provinces. EQ is also regressed by 
province; however no significant results are found (with sample sizes of only 17-30, it is likely 
that the tests lack power). Finally, a pooled regression is run (not tabulated) which shows that the 
negative interlock relationship is strongest and only significant in the subsample of Ontario 
firms. 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
  The Kothari et al. (2005) performance matched discretionary accrual model is utilized as 
an alternative earnings quality test. First, discretionary accruals are measured based on the 
modified-Jones model with return on assets (ROA). Each firm is then matched with the closest 
ROA firm in its industry and performance-matched discretionary accruals are equal to the 
difference between discretionary accruals and the corresponding performance-matched firm’s 
discretionary accruals. Once again EQ is equal to DA multiplied by minus one. Table 13 shows 
the results of the Kothari model. The magnitude of the coefficients are actually larger, but 
measured with less precision in this model. For instance, Interlock has a 0.028 coefficient versus 
0.017in the main regression. In this model, firms with a higher PDScore are associated with 
higher earnings quality (significant at 0.07). The rest of the results show consistent directions as 
the main regression; however none of the variables except for Size have a significant 
relationship.  
29 
 
 [Insert Table 13 here] 
  Data from the two main models (Governance Disclosures and Earning Quality) are also 
examined comparing the firms with one interlocking directorship against firms with more than 
one interlocking directorship. No significant differences are found for Governance Disclosures or 
Earning Quality (proxy disclosure scores are found to be almost identical for both interlocked 
groups). Similarly, the regressions are rerun comparing firms with no interlocking directorships 
to firms with multiple interlocking directorships. Once again, the results are robust/show almost 
identical results as the main regressions for both models (not tabulated). Finally, two measures of 
tax avoidance, GAAP-effective tax rate and cash-effective tax rate, are run using a similar model 
as Eqn. (1) and Eqn. (4). These tests are performed since the structure of the board can influence 
the tax policy of a firm (Kim & Zhang, 2016). The regressions (not tabulated) show no 
association between Interlock and how much GAAP-based or actual cash taxes a firm pays. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
  Instead of Interlock being an indicator variable, an alternative measure- %Board-
Interlocked was inserted into Eqn. (1). Percentage of board interlocked is measured as the 
number of directors in interlocking relationships divided by the total number of board members. 
The first column of Table 14 (pdscore_20) shows the result of the regression. The results are 
identical to the original model with %Board-Interlocked and OldCEO having a significant 
negative association with PDScore and BusyDIR, Size and INDChair having a significant 
positive association with PDScore. Additionally, to address possible multicollinearity between 
Size and Board Size, an alternative measure for Board Size was employed (board size divided by 
the log of total assets). This measure is not significantly correlated with Size and the regressions 
(not tabulated) show that the results are consistent. 
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  To eliminate possible endogeneity from the dependent proxy disclosure score variable 
and the independent INDChair variable, Best Practice Disclosure number six (Independence of 
the Board Chair), is eliminated and a new PDScore is calculated out of 19
16
. The results of the 
robustness test, based on Eqn. (1), are shown in Table 14. INDChair is still significant at the 1% 
level. The negative effect of Interlock (and positive effect of BusyDIR) on PDScore19 are 
essentially the same. Similarly, to address concerns about possible endogeneity from interlock, 
Best Practice Disclosure numbers four and five are taken out of PDScore
17
. The score is then 
calculated out of 18. Finally, all three checklist items (Best Practice Disclosure numbers four, 
five and six) are eliminated from the checklist. Once again the results for all of the models are 
still essentially the same. 
[Insert Table 14 here] 
 PDScore is separated into two parts: checklist items that only deal with disclosures in the 
proxy statements (DisclosuresOnly) and items that also encompass governance policies or 
practices (PoliciesPracticesDisclosures). Eight of the items are identified as dealing with 
corporate policies and/or best practices (numbers three, five, six, eleven, fifteen, sixteen, 
seventeen, and twenty- see Table 1), while the remaining twelve are considered purely 
disclosures. Descriptive statistics (not tabulated) reveal that interlocked firms actually scored 
higher on the DisclosuresOnly category (8.78 vs. 7.81), but interlocked firms scored lower on the 
PoliciesPracticesDisclosures category (4.58 vs. 4.77). The new checklists are substituted for 
PDScore and regressions are run, as shown in Table 15. The DisclosuresOnly column shows that 
there are no significance differences between interlock and non-interlocked firms. However, 
interlocked firms score significantly lower in the PoliciesPracticesDisclosures column. Thus, the 
                                                          
16
 Although this checklist item measures whether the chairperson is independent, whether this information is clearly 
shown in the proxy statement and whether this information is discussed. 
17 
These two checklist items measure whether interlocks and interlock policies are discussed in the proxy statements. 
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results show that it is the disclosure of governance practices driving the results, rather than just 
the other disclosures recommended by the CCGG. As well, these results are consistent with those 
found while employing GlobeScore as the dependent variable. Additionally, it should be noted 
that older CEOs have significantly negative relationships with all the governance scores. Thus, 
this gives stronger evidence for H1a that there is an agency effect in regards to governance 
disclosures. Interlock directors are not associated with simple or basic disclosures (measured by 
DisclosuresOnly), but are negatively associated (supported at <0.01) with higher level 
governance disclosures (measured by PoliciesPracticesDisclosures). 
[Insert Table 15 here] 
  Overall, the results suggest that there is a negative relationship with interlocks and 
voluntary governance disclosures/corporate governance. Although the univariate statistics do not 
find a significant difference between Interlock and PDScore, when other governance factors are 
controlled for then the relationship is revealed. Furthermore, the PDScore is highly correlated 
with the GlobeScore (0.73) which also documents this relationship- as do a number of robustness 
and additional tests. Finally, standard errors robustness tests for heteroskedasticity are performed 
for all the regressions and no significant changes to the results were found. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusion  
  This study contributes to ongoing corporate governance research regarding interlocked 
board of directors. Using a sample of 120 medium and large cap Canadian firms, the study 
extends prior research by examining the relationship of interlocked directorships and the level of 
voluntary governance disclosures, governance quality and the quality of reported earnings. 
Previous work has found mixed results linking interlocked board of directors with corporate 
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governance and accounting measures. Using a direct measure of interlocks and accruals as a 
proxy for earnings quality, this study finds that board interlocks have a negative effect on the 
level of governance disclosures, but a positive effect on earnings quality. This supports an 
agency theory perspective (hypothesis 1a) for disclosures where interlocked boards have a self-
serving interest to manage which pieces of information about them are disclosed. On the other 
hand, as earnings quality is often seen by investors as more imperative than voluntary 
disclosures, the interlock findings suggest that interlocked boards may have an overall positive 
effect on the performance of a firm. Governance disclosures are also most significantly 
associated with firm size and the independence of the chairperson.  
  Interlocked boards of directors are found to provide fewer governance disclosures, but 
enhanced earnings quality. This suggests that regulation limiting board interlocks may not be 
necessary, at least from an accounting point of view. The results are consistent with (hypothesis 
2b) alignment effect theory. Alignment effect theory predicts that ownership concentration 
creates incentives to report high quality earnings, as the controlling shareholders have incentives 
to keep earnings management within proper bounds. Family, blockholder or other closely 
controlled corporations have a long term investment horizon, are more likely to be actively 
involved in management and are less likely to focus on short term earnings (Villalonga & Amit, 
2006). The results found here can extend alignment effect theory to include interlocks. By 
interlocking boards of directors, firms can obey regulations, such as independence rules, while 
establishing reciprocal relationships with other firms where ownership concentration is high.
18
 
Interlocked boards of directors are almost always reciprocal shareholders. Moreover, this aspect 
of alignment theory can explain the low voluntary governance disclosure/high earnings quality 
                                                          
18
 Desender et al. (2013) and Di Bartolomeo & Canofari (2015) provide comprehensive discussions on interlocked 
directors, board structures and ownership concentrations. 
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findings of this paper, as these firms have long term incentives and sufficient monitoring 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), but low motivation to disclose proprietary information (in this case 
important governance information relating to a firm’s policies and practices). 
 To the author’s knowledge this is the first paper examining how interlocks relate to 
corporate governance and earnings quality in the Canadian environment. It adds to the literature 
by finding that when firms have some reporting discretion, interlocked boards of directors are 
associated with lower corporate governance disclosures, but higher earnings quality. Although 
this study employs a cross-sectional methodology in measuring interlocked directorships, a 
potential limitation is that only one year was analyzed. This year was particularly good for 
Canadian firms, compared with 2009 and 2010 when earnings were lower due to a recession. 
Thus, other accrual based models may be examined along with time series regressions. While 
this study shows that interlocking directorships do affect disclosures and earnings quality, future 
research may determine whether these associations are permanent over a longer period. Other 
related accounting, finance and general corporate governance variables can also be analyzed. 
Moreover, future research could also focus explicitly on who appoints the interlocked 
directors—be it CEO recommendations or institutional investors. 
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Table 1 
Voluntary Proxy Disclosure Score (PDScore) Checklist 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Best Practice Disclosure 
Scoring 
(1 if disclosed, 0 otherwise) 
1) Table of contents or other 
organizing mechanism 
Coded 1 if a table of contents or a similar organizing 
mechanism is provided 
 
2) Visual aids employed 
Coded 1 if a number of coloured graphs or charts are 
provided and/or directors’ pictures are provided 
3) Majority voting policy 
Coded 1 if a majority voting policy has been implement 
and clearly disclosed 
4) Board interlocks/no board 
interlocks discussed 
Coded 1 if board interlocks (or lack of) are clearly shown 
and discussed 
5) Policy limiting interlocks Coded 1 if a policy limiting board interlocks is discussed 
6) Policy of board chair independence 
Coded 1 if there is a policy for the board chairperson’s 
independence and it is clearly shown in the proxy and 
discussed 
7) Table clearly showing 
independence with non-independence 
explained 
Coded 1 if a table clearly showing the independence of 
each director is provided, with all non-independent 
directors explained why 
8) Nominee profiles including share 
and option ownership 
Coded 1 if disclosures show the share and options 
ownership of each director in main nominee profile 
9) Nominee profiles are well 
organized, provide useful information 
and are easy to read 
Coded 1 if director information is well organized, clear, 
easy to read and not overly wordy in description (easy for 
reader to find desired information) 
10) Director skills matrix 
Coded 1 if a clear director skills matrix is provided, (e.g. 
listing the directors on the vertical axis and the skills on 
the horizontal axis) 
11) Director succession plan 
Coded 1 if disclosures indicate that a director succession 
plan is in place and some details are provided 
12) Director compensation is 
detailed, well-organized and written 
in plain language 
Coded 1 if director compensation is detailed, well-
organized and written in plain language 
13) Table/chart to show committees 
of the board 
Coded 1 if a clear table, chart or matrix is provided, listing 
the directors on one axis and the committees on the other 
axis 
14) Attendance of committee 
meetings is detailed 
Coded 1 if attendance for each committee member is 
provided 
15) Board of Directors peer 
evaluation 
Coded 1 if a director’s peer evaluation program has been 
disclosed with details beyond the minimum requirements 
16) Board of Directors self-
assessment 
Coded 1 if a directors’ self-assessment program has been 
disclosed with details beyond the minimum requirements 
17) Directors continuing education 
program details 
 
Coded 1 if disclosures indicate a directors’ continuing 
education program with details beyond the minimum 
requirements  
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18) Effectiveness of the 
compensation program/historical 
compensation 
Coded 1 if disclosures discuss the effectiveness of the 
compensation program or historical compensation is 
shown beyond the minimum requirements 
19) Compensation-performance 
linkage chart 
Coded 1 if a visual mechanism is employed to show the 
reader the link between executive compensation and 
performance 
 
20) Shareholder Say on Pay 
Coded 1 if a shareholder “Say on Pay” program has been 
implemented and clearly disclosed 
 
TOTAL SCORE /20 
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Table 2 
Sample Descriptions 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A: Sample description for Voluntary Disclosures 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Total sample
19
                132 
 
Less 12 for which data or proxy statements were not available         (12) 
 
Final Sample for H1                          120 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B: Sample description for Earnings Quality 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Final Sample for H1               120 
 
Less 24 Financial firms not included in the modified Jones model         (24) 
 
Less 3 Utilities firms not included in the modified Jones model           (3) 
 
Less 3 Other Industry firms not included in the modified Jones model          (3) 
 
Final Sample for H2                                                  90 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
   
                                                          
19
 Includes 12 random firms with insufficient data, which were then replaced to arrive at the final sample size of 120 
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Table 3 
Industry Composition of Sample TSX Firms  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A: Industry Composition 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Industry    Sample % with Interlocks Average # Interlocks 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Consumer       25   44.00%  0.44 
 
Energy        23   73.91%  1.30 
 
Financial       13   69.23%  1.08 
 
Health Care        1     0.00%  0.00 
 
Industrial       17   47.06%  0.82 
 
Information Technologies      2              50.00%  0.50 
 
Materials       23   56.52%  1.04 
 
Media         6              50.00%  0.67 
 
Telecommunication Services      3   66.67%  1.33 
 
Transportation        2   100.00%  3.00 
 
Utilities        3   66.67%  1.00 
 
Wholesale        2     0.00%  0.00 
 
TOTAL      120   56.67%  0.93 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B: Industry Composition by NAICS Code 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Industry    Sample  % with Interlocks  Average # Interlocks 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
21- 23  Mining, Utilities and Construction         
          44   68.18%  1.27 
 
31-33 Manufacturing       
          27   44.44%  0.59 
 
42-48 Retailers and Wholesalers         
         22   50.00%  0.73 
 
51-54 Information, Financial, Insurance, Real Estate, Management and Professional Services      
         24   58.33%  0.88 
 
71-72 Entertainment, Accommodation and Food Services        
          3   33.33%  0.67 
 
 
  TOTAL     120   56.67%  0.93 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Interlocked and Non-Interlocked Firms 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable Interlocked 
Mean  
(n=68) 
Non-Interlocked 
Mean  
(n=52) 
T-test  between 
Interlocked vs. Non-
Interlocked firms 
 
Asset 
 
62925 
 
16991 
 
2.00** 
 
PPE 
 
10754 
 
6565 
 
1.58* 
 
Sales 
 
8945 
 
6445 
 
1.37* 
 
BoardSize 
 
11.6 
 
10.5 
 
1.83* 
 
Leverage 
 
0.239 
 
0.197 
 
1.58* 
 
BKMK 
 
0.819 
 
0.566 
 
2.39** 
 
CEOTenure 
 
6.471 
 
8.654 
 
-1.85* 
 
FemaleDIR 
 
0.129 
 
0.165 
 
-1.77* 
 
Cross-listed 
 
0.471 
 
0.462 
 
0.10 
 
Institutional 
 
0.147 
 
0.154 
 
0.10 
 
PDScore 
 
13.37 
 
12.58 
 
1.08 
 
 
DA 
 
(n=51) 
0.040 
 
(n=39) 
0.051 
 
 
-1.40* 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
See Appendix II for variable definitions 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed 
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Table 5 
Summary Statistics of Proxy Disclosure Scores 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
Interlocked 
 
Non-
Interlocked 
 
T-test 
between 
Interlocked and 
Non-Interlocked  
 
 
All 
1) Table of contents or other organizing 
mechanism 0.81 0.81 
 
0.02 0.81 
2) Visual aids employed 0.74 0.65 0.96 0.70 
3) Majority voting policy 0.65 0.73 -0.97 0.68 
4) Board interlocks/no board interlocks discussed 0.69 0.65 0.43 0.68 
5) Policy limiting interlocks 0.07 0.21 -2.23** 0.13 
6) Independence policies 0.74 0.52 2.49*** 0.64 
7) Table clearly showing independence with non-
independence explained 0.35 0.37 
 
-0.14 0.36 
8) Nominee profiles including share and option 
ownership 0.93 0.81 
 
1.96** 0.88 
9) Nominee profiles are well organized, provide 
useful information and are easy to read 0.78 0.71 
 
0.84 0.75 
10) Director skills matrix 0.51 0.27 2.77*** 0.41 
11) Director succession plan 0.46 0.65 -2.18** 0.54 
12) Director compensation is detailed, well-
organized and written in plain language 0.78 0.79 
 
-0.12 0.78 
13) Table/chart to show committees of the board 0.66 0.56 1.16 0.62 
14) Attendance of committee meetings is detailed 0.97 0.83 2.77*** 0.91 
15) Board of Directors peer evaluation 0.68 0.69 -0.18 0.68 
16) Board of Directors self assessment 0.85 0.83 0.38 0.84 
17) Directors continuing education program 
details 0.71 0.71 
 
-0.07 0.71 
18) Effectiveness of the compensation 
program/historical compensation 0.97 0.92 
 
1.18 0.95 
19) Compensation-performance linkage chart 0.59 0.44 1.59* 0.53 
20) Shareholder Say on Pay 0.44 0.42 0.20 0.43 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Non-Interlocked: Mean score for non-interlocked firms 
Interlocked: Mean score for interlocked firms 
T-test: Two tailed t-tests between Non-Interlocked and Interlocked means 
All: Mean score for all firms in sample 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 6 
Correlation Matrix of Variables for Voluntary Disclosures, Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) diagonal 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
See Appendix II for variable definitions 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level   
 PDScore 
 
Interlock Busy DIR Size Board 
Size 
IND Chair Leverage BKMK CEO 
Tenure 
 
PDScore 
  
0.05 
 
0.10 
 
0.48*** 
 
0.42*** 
 
0.45*** 
 
0.09 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.22** 
 
Interlock 
 
0.03 
  
0.14 
 
0.21** 
 
0.20** 
 
0.18* 
 
0.12 
 
0.21** 
 
-0.19** 
 
Busy DIR 
 
0.10 
 
0.10 
 
 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.02 
 
0.10 
 
-0.03 
 
0.00 
 
Size 
 
0.51***   
 
0.20**  
 
-0.04 
 
 
 
0.64*** 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.03 
 
-0.13 
 
Board Size 
 
0.41*** 
 
0.20** 
 
-0.07 
 
0.64*** 
 
 
 
0.18* 
 
0.26*** 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.14 
 
IND Chair 
 
0.47*** 
 
0.18* 
 
-0.05 
 
0.14 
 
0.18* 
 
 
 
0.06 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.19* 
 
Leverage 
 
0.09 
 
0.13 
 
0.09 
 
0.23** 
 
0.26*** 
 
0.09 
 
 
 
0.07 
 
-0.17* 
 
BKMK 
 
0.07 
 
0.23** 
 
-0.10 
 
0.14 
 
0.07 
 
0.03 
 
0.19* 
 
 
 
-0.01 
 
CEO Tenure 
 
-0.19* 
 
-0.20** 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.16 
 
-0.12 
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Table 7 
Correlation Matrix of Variables for Earnings Quality, Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) diagonal 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
See Appendix II for variable definitions 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level
 EQ  Interlock Size Leverage BKMK Female 
DIR 
Cross-listed NetLoss PDScore 
 
EQ 
 
 
 
 
0.15 
 
0.04 
 
0.10 
 
-0.24** 
 
0.10 
 
0.03 
 
-0.35*** 
 
0.11 
 
Interlock 
 
0.13 
 
 
 
0.16 
 
0.24** 
 
0.24** 
 
0.26** 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.05 
 
0.08 
 
Size 
 
0.01   
 
0.17  
 
 
 
0.30*** 
 
0.07 
 
0.19* 
 
0.16 
 
-0.21* 
 
0.50*** 
 
Leverage 
 
0.04 
 
0.21** 
 
0.26** 
 
 
 
0.10 
 
0.02 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.01 
 
0.10 
 
BKMK 
 
-0.15 
 
0.23** 
 
0.14 
 
-0.04 
 
 
 
-0.24** 
 
 
-0.14 
 
-0.36*** 
 
-0.04 
 
Female 
DIR 
 
0.04 
 
-0.29*** 
 
0.25** 
 
0.07 
 
-0.11 
 
 
 
0.04 
 
-0.13 
 
0.14 
 
Cross-listed 
 
0.11 
 
-0.07 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.10 
 
-0.05 
 
0.10 
 
 
 
0.11 
 
 
0.16 
 
NetLoss 
 
-0.26** 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.04 
 
0.25** 
 
-0.11 
 
0.11 
  
-0.11 
 
PDScore 
 
0.08 
 
0.05 
 
0.53*** 
 
0.14 
 
0.03 
 
0.20* 
 
0.14 
 
-0.12 
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Table 8 
Results of OLS Regression for Voluntary Disclosures 
 
PDScorei= α0 + α1Interlocki + α2BusyDIRi + α3Sizei + α4BoardSizei + α5INDChairi + 
α6Leveragei + α7BKMKi + α8YoungCEOi + α9OldCEOi + α10CEOTenurei +α11Cross-Listedi + 
α12Institutionali + α13-16Industryi + μ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
See Appendix II for variable definitions 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed 
  
Variable Expected Sign OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
       
 
Interlock 
 
? 
 
-0.063** 
(-2.03)    
       
BusyDIR 
 
+ 0.058** 
(2.17) 
       
Size + 0.049*** 
(4.23) 
       
BoardSize + 0.105 
(1.53) 
       
INDChair + 0.179*** 
(5.63)  
       
Leverage - -0.135 
(-1.27) 
       
BKMK - 0.001 
(0.03) 
       
YoungCEO 
 
+ 
 
0.018 
(0.49) 
       
OldCEO 
 
- -0.084** 
(-2.17) 
       
CEOTenure 
 
- -0.001 
(-0.36) 
       
Cross-listed + 0.001 
(-0.04) 
       
Institutional + -0.047 
(-1.14) 
       
Constant  ? 
 
-0.101 
(-0.71)    
       
Industry 
Effects 
 
 
 
Yes 
       
 
Observations 
  
120 
       
 
R² 
  
0.515 
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Table 9 
Results of OLS Regression for Discretionary Accruals 
 
EQi = α0 + α1Interlocki + α2BusyDIRi + α3Sizei + α4BoardSizei + α5INDChairi + α6Leveragei + 
α7BKMKi + α8YoungCEOi + α9OldCEOi + α10CEOTenurei + α11FemaleDIRi + α12Cross-listedi 
+ α13PDScore + α14NetLoss + α15-17Industryi + μ         
______________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
See Appendix II for variable definitions 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed 
 
  
Variable Expected Sign OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
       
 
Interlock 
 
? 
 
0.017* 
(1.90) 
       
Size + -0.004 
(-1.07) 
       
INDChair + -0.006 
(-0.65) 
       
Leverage - 0.029 
(0.93) 
       
BKMK - -0.009 
(-1.26) 
       
YoungCEO 
 
+ 0.013 
(1.35) 
       
OldCEO 
 
- 0.012 
(1.05) 
       
CEOTenure 
 
- 0.000 
(0.59) 
       
FemaleDIR 
 
+ 0.024 
(0.51) 
       
Cross-listed + 0.010 
(1.04) 
 
       
PDScore + 0.031 
(1.16) 
 
       
NetLoss - -0.029** 
(2.10) 
       
Constant ? 
 
-0.050 
(-1.65) 
       
Industry 
Effects 
 
 
 
Yes 
       
 
Observations 
  
90 
       
 
R² 
  
0.233 
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Table 10 
Pearson-Spearman Correlation for Proxy Disclosures and Globe and Mail Governance 
Scores 
 
PD Score: Proxy Disclosure score (/20) 
Globe Score: Globe and Mail/Report on Business Board Games governance score (/100) 
Globe_Board: Globe score Board Composition category (/31) 
Globe_Shareholder: Globe score Shareholder Rights category (/31) 
Globe_Comp: Globe score Shareholding and Compensation category (/26) 
Globe_Disclosure: Globe score Voluntary Disclosures category (/12) 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level   
 PD Score 
 
Globe Score Globe_ 
Board 
Globe_ 
Shareholder 
Globe_ 
Comp 
Globe_ 
Disclosure 
 
PD Score 
 
 
 
 
0.72*** 
 
0.62*** 
 
0.54*** 
 
0.56*** 
 
0.58*** 
 
Globe Score 
 
0.73*** 
     
 
 Globe_ 
Board 
 
0.66*** 
     
 
Globe_ 
Shareholder 
 
0.58***   
     
 
Globe_ 
Comp 
 
0.56*** 
     
 
 Globe_ 
Disclosure 
 
0.58*** 
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Table 11 
Results of OLS Regression for Globe and Mail Governance Scores
20
 
 
GlobeScorei = α0 + α1Interlocki + α2BusyDIRi + α3Sizei + α4BoardSizei + α5INDChairi + 
α6Leveragei + α7BKMKi + α8YoungCEOi + α9OldCEOi + α10CEOTenurei +α11Cross-Listedi + 
α12Institutionali + α13-16Industryi + μ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
See Appendix II for variable definitions 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed
                                                          
20
 Table 11 has the Globe and Mail/Report on Business Board Games governance score (GlobeScore) as the 
dependent variable, in place of the Proxy Disclosure Score (PDScore). 
Variable OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(globe_100) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(globe_69) 
         
 
Interlock 
 
-0.057** 
(-2.27)  
 
-0.060* 
(-1.96) 
         
BusyDIR 
 
0.016 
(0.73) 
0.025 
(0.95) 
         
Size 0.055*** 
(5.59) 
0.067*** 
(5.61) 
         
BoardSize 0.003 
(0.51) 
0.002 
(0.35) 
         
INDChair 0.126*** 
(5.08) 
0.102*** 
(3.35) 
         
Leverage -0.065 
(-0.79) 
-0.068 
(-0.68) 
         
BKMK -0.066** 
(-2.52) 
-0.073** 
(-2.27) 
         
YoungCEO 
 
-0.033 
(-1.16) 
-0.037 
(-1.04) 
         
OldCEO 
 
-0.030 
(-0.99) 
-0.054 
(-1.43) 
         
CEOTenure 
 
-0.004* 
(-1.91) 
-0.004* 
(-1.70) 
         
Cross-listed -0.021 
(-0.81) 
-0.037 
(-1.18) 
         
Institutional -0.026 
(-0.77) 
-0.009 
(-0.21) 
         
Constant 
 
0.375 
(3.50)    
0.343 
(2.61) 
         
Industry 
Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
         
Observations 96 96          
 
R² 
 
0.605 
 
0.536 
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Table 12 
Results of Provincial Effects on Voluntary Disclosures
21
 
 
PDScorei= α0 + α1Interlocki + α2BusyDIRi + α3Sizei + α4BoardSizei + α5INDChairi + 
α6Leveragei + α7BKMKi + α8YoungCEOi + α9OldCEOi + α10CEOTenurei +α11Cross-Listedi + 
α12-15Industryi + μ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
See Appendix II for variable definitions 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed   
                                                          
21
 Table 12 runs the main disclosures model separately for firms headquartered in the provinces of Alberta, Ontario, 
Quebec, and in any other province. 
Variable OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(Alberta) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(Ontario) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(Quebec) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(Other provinces) 
 
Interlock 
 
0.008 
(0.08) 
 
-0.150*** 
(-3.31)    
 
-0.161** 
(-2.97)    
 
-0.157 
(-1.42)    
BusyDIR 
 
0.053 
(0.50) 
0.038 
(1.07) 
0.115** 
(2.29) 
0.093 
(0.97) 
Size 0.008 
(0.14) 
0.070*** 
(4.69) 
-0.029 
(-0.82) 
0.133** 
(2.91) 
BoardSize 0.269 
(0.87) 
0.181 
(2.10) 
-0.150 
(-0.81) 
-0.025 
(-0.09) 
INDChair 0.156 
(0.98)  
0.192*** 
(3.84) 
0.225*** 
(3.32)  
0.295* 
(2.27) 
Leverage -0.414 
(-1.01) 
0.030 
(-0.21) 
-0.087 
(-0.28) 
-0.013 
(-0.05) 
BKMK -0.070 
(-0.58) 
0.003 
(0.10) 
-0.005 
(-0.13) 
0.095 
(0.90) 
YoungCEO 
 
-0.057 
(-0.31) 
0.073 
(1.20) 
0.063 
(0.82) 
-0.118 
(-0.99) 
OldCEO 
 
-0.149 
(-1.04) 
0.037 
(0.67) 
-0.069 
(-0.77) 
-0.208 
(-1.74) 
CEOTenure 
 
0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.005 
(-1.22) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.27) 
-0.010 
(-1.29) 
Cross-listed 0.027 
(0.23) 
-0.096 
(-1.87) 
-0.090 
(-1.11) 
-0.033 
(-0.33) 
Constant  -0.390 
(-0.57)    
-0.331 
(-1.77)    
1.230 
(3.29)    
-0.533 
(-1.03)    
Industry 
Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
 
26 
 
48 
 
24 
 
22 
 
R² 
 
0.610 
 
0.726 
 
0.890 
 
0.833 
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Table 13 
Results of Robustness Test for Discretionary Accruals
22
 
EQi = α0 + α1Interlocki + α2BusyDIRi + α3Sizei + α4BoardSizei + α5INDChairi + α6Leveragei + 
α7BKMKi + α8YoungCEOi + α9OldCEOi + α10CEOTenurei + α11FemaleDIRi + α12Cross-listedi 
+ α13PDScore + α14NetLoss + α15-17Industryi + μ         
______________________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
See Appendix II for variable definitions 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed 
                                                          
22
 Table 13 employs the Kothari et al. (2005) performance matched discretionary accrual model of earnings quality 
is run instead of the main (Dechow, et al., 1995) model. 
Variable Expected 
Sign 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
  
 
Interlock 
 
? 
 
0.028 
(1.45) 
  
Size + -0.017** 
(-2.16) 
  
INDChair + -0.026 
(-1.27) 
  
Leverage - 0.042 
(0.64) 
  
BKMK - -0.016 
(-1.12) 
  
YoungCEO 
 
+ 0.000 
(0.02) 
  
OldCEO 
 
- 0.015 
(0.62) 
  
CEOTenure 
 
- -0.001 
(-0.58) 
  
FemaleDIR 
 
+ -0.013 
(-0.13) 
  
Cross-listed + 0.027 
(1.40) 
 
  
PDScore + 0.107* 
(1.85) 
  
NetLoss - -0.028 
(0.99) 
  
Constant ? 
 
0.083 
(1.33) 
  
Industry 
Effects 
 
 
 
Yes 
  
 
Observations 
  
90 
  
 
R² 
  
0.158 
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Table 14 
Results of Robustness Tests of Voluntary Disclosures
23
 
 
PDScorei = α0 + α1Interlocki + α2BusyDIRi + α3Sizei + α4BoardSizei + α5INDChairi + 
α6Leveragei + α7BKMKi + α8YoungCEOi + α9OldCEOi + α10CEOTenurei +α11Cross-Listedi + 
α12-15Industryi + μ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
See Appendix II for variable definitions 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed 
  
                                                          
23
 In the first column of Table 14, the main disclosures model is run with %Board-Interlocked as an alternative to 
the Interlock dummy variable. Columns two to four run the main disclosures model, but eliminate possible 
endogenous items from the Proxy Disclosure Score (PDScore) (reducing the score to 19, 18 and 17, respectfully). 
Variable OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(pdscore_20) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(pdscore_19) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(pdscore_18) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(pdscore_17) 
 
Interlock 
 
 
 
-0.062* 
(-1.86)    
 
-0.056* 
(-1.74)    
 
-0.059* 
(-1.74)    
%Board- 
Interlocked 
-0.172* 
(-1.87) 
   
BusyDIR 
 
0.064** 
(2.35) 
0.060** 
(2.11) 
0.056** 
(2.01) 
0.058* 
(1.98) 
Size 0.050*** 
(4.31) 
0.052*** 
(4.27) 
0.050*** 
(4.22) 
0.053*** 
(4.21) 
BoardSize 0.073 
(1.07) 
0.100 
(1.38) 
0.121* 
(1.72) 
0.125* 
(1.69) 
INDChair 0.168*** 
(5.39) 
0.132*** 
(3.98)  
0.187*** 
(5.74)  
0.144*** 
(4.19)  
Leverage -0.148 
(-1.40) 
-0.139 
(-1.25) 
-0.104 
(-0.95) 
-0.106 
(-0.92) 
BKMK -0.013 
(-0.51) 
-0.007 
(-0.27) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
-0.002 
(-0.06) 
YoungCEO 
 
0.008 
(0.24) 
0.015 
(0.39) 
0.022 
(0.59) 
0.024 
(0.62) 
OldCEO 
 
-0.092** 
(-2.38) 
-0.092** 
(-2.27) 
-0.090** 
(-2.27) 
-0.092** 
(-2.21) 
CEOTenure 
 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
Cross-listed -0.006 
(-0.17) 
0.002 
(0.08) 
0.004 
(0.12) 
0.007 
(0.20) 
Constant  -0.114 
(-0.34)    
-0.114 
(-0.72)    
-0.155 
(-1.00)    
-0.154 
(-0.94)    
Industry 
Effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Observations 
 
120 
 
120 
 
120 
 
120 
 
R² 
 
0.507 
 
0.459 
 
0.526 
 
0.472 
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Table 15 
Results of Robustness Tests of Proxy Disclosures Score
24
 
 
Scorei= α0 + α1Interlocki + α2BusyDIRi + α3Sizei + α4BoardSizei + α5INDChairi + α6Leveragei 
+ α7BKMKi + α8YoungCEOi + α9OldCEOi + α10CEOTenurei +α11Cross-Listedi + 
α12Institutionali + α13-16Industryi + μ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
See Appendix II for variable definitions 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed 
  
                                                          
24
 Table 15 separates PDScore, the dependent variable in the main disclosures model, into two parts: checklist items 
that only deal with disclosures in the proxy statements (DisclosuresOnly) and disclosures that encompass 
governance policies or practices (PoliciesPracticesDisclosures). 
Variable Expected Sign OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(DisclosuresOnly) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
(PoliciesPracticesDisclosures) 
      
 
Interlock 
 
? 
 
0.002 
(0.06)  
 
-0.152*** 
(-4.65)   
      
BusyDIR 
 
+ 0.054* 
(1.74) 
0.068** 
(2.43) 
      
Size + 0.042*** 
(3.09) 
0.072*** 
(5.90) 
      
BoardSize + 0.010 
(1.39) 
-0.003 
(-0.50) 
      
INDChair + 0.122*** 
(3.28) 
0.267*** 
(7.98) 
      
Leverage - -0.166 
(-1.33) 
-0.058 
(-0.52) 
      
BKMK - -0.022 
(-0.73) 
0.022 
(0.81) 
      
YoungCEO 
 
+ 
 
0.014 
(0.27) 
0.023 
(0.60) 
      
OldCEO 
 
- -0.113** 
(-2.49) 
-0.050 
(-1.21) 
      
CEOTenure 
 
- -0.003 
(-0.88) 
0.002 
(0.59) 
      
Cross-listed + -0.034 
(-0.90) 
0.050 
(1.47) 
      
Institutional + -0.018 
(-0.37) 
-0.085* 
(-1.94) 
      
Constant  ? 
 
0.167 
(1.21)    
-0.195 
(-1.57)    
      
Industry 
Effects 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
      
 
Observations 
  
120 
 
120 
      
 
R² 
  
0.409 
 
0.608 
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Company 2 
 
Company 1 
 
Director B 
 
Director A 
 
Company 2 
 
Company 1 
 
Director B 
 
Director A 
Figure 1 
Interlock Measure 
Interlock (or “Direct Interlock”) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not an Interlock 
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Appendix I 
Examples of Illustrative Disclosures 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
3) Majority voting policy 
Our policy provides that in an uncontested election of directors at an annual meeting of 
shareholders, the votes cast in favour of the election of a director nominee must represent a 
majority of the total votes cast at the Meeting. If that is not the case, that director must tender his 
or her resignation for consideration by the balance of the Board. If for any reason the Board does 
not accept the resignation, it will promptly disclose its final decision in a press release. 
(TransAlta Corporation) 
 
5) Policy limiting interlocks 
To avoid potential conflicts of interest, our corporate governance guidelines do not allow 
interlocking directorships. An interlocking directorship would occur if a member of senior 
management of our company serves on the board or as a trustee of a company or institution that 
employs one of our directors. We do not have any directors who serve together on boards of 
other public companies. 
(Thomson Reuters Corporation) 
 
11) Director succession plan 
The Committee identifies and assesses candidates for board appointment or nomination. Our 
forward-looking skills matrix identifies skills with the greatest opportunity to strengthen the 
board and our search for future nominees is focused on continually increasing diversity within 
the boardroom.  
Before recommending a new board candidate, the Committee considers his or her performance, 
independence, competencies, financial acumen, skills and diversity. Behavioural attributes such 
as integrity, accountability and independent mindedness are also required. 
(...) 
The Committee requires the Secretary to maintain an evergreen list of potential directors whose 
skills complement the board and whom the Committee would evaluate, if the individual is 
available when an opening arises. 
(Nexen Inc.) 
 
15) Board of Directors peer evaluation & 16) Board of Directors self assessment 
The Board of Directors has implemented, and reviews, from time to time, a comprehensive 
process to annually assess its effectiveness, the effectiveness of its committees, the Board Chair, 
the Committee Chairs and individual directors. This process is under the supervision of the 
Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee and the Board Chair and is comprised of the 
following steps: 
(...) 
The Board Chair leads on an annual basis a peer review process through one-on-one meetings 
with each individual director. The Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee also 
considers on an annual basis the appropriateness of conducting a peer assessment through an 
independent advisor. 
(Canadian National Railway Company) 
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17) Directors continuing education program details 
On an ongoing basis, the bank: 
• Ensures that directors have timely access to materials and information required to properly 
discharge their responsibilities 
• Maintains a secure directors’ portal for prompt dissemination of information and provides 
published information, articles of interest and other relevant materials to directors in between 
meetings 
• Conducts information sessions for directors on significant, specialized or complex aspects of 
business operations 
• Schedules at least one off-site board meeting a year to familiarize directors with regional and 
international operations, including visits to the bank’s operations and meetings with local senior 
management 
• In 2011, the board visited the bank’s operations in Bangkok, Thailand, and the board also met 
in Nova Scotia, as part of the annual shareholder meeting 
• Canvasses directors for suggestions as to topics and issues about which they would like to 
receive a seminar, briefing or a report 
All of the directors are members of the Institute of Corporate Directors (“ICD”) and have access 
to ICD events designed to foster director education and advocate for best practices in 
governance. 
(Bank of Nova Scotia) 
 
20) Shareholder Say on Pay 
PotashCorp implemented an advisory say on pay vote in connection with its 2010 Annual 
Meeting and currently intends to hold an advisory say on pay vote at each annual meeting as part 
of the Corporation’s process of shareholder engagement. 
(...) 
Our “Say on Pay” resolution received overwhelming shareholder support with over 97% 
affirmative votes. 
(Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc.) 
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Appendix II 
Variable List 
 
PDScore: Proxy Disclosure score  
Interlock: Dummy equal to one if the firm has a direct interlock 
%Board-Interlock: the number of directors in interlocking relationships divided by the total 
number of board members 
Size: Log of total assets 
Asset: Total firm assets (in millions) 
PPE: Gross property, plant and equipment of the firm (in millions) 
Sales: Gross sales revenue (in millions) 
BoardSize: Number of directors on the board 
Leverage: Debt of the firm as a percentage of total assets 
BKMK: Book-to-Market value 
CEOTenure: Number of years as CEO (proxy statement date) 
YoungCEO: Dummy equal to one if the CEO is under the age of fifty 
OldCEO: Dummy equal to one if the CEO is aged sixty or older 
Cross-Listed: Dummy equal to one if the firm is listed in the U.S. 
DA: Absolute value of Discretionary Accruals 
EQ: Earnings Quality 
FemaleDIR: Percentage of directors which are female  
NetLoss: Dummy equal to one if the firm had a net loss 
Institutional: Dummy equal to one if the firm had a institutional investor 
Globe Score: Globe and Mail/Report on Business Board Games governance score (/100) 
Globe_Board: Globe score Board Composition category (/31) 
Globe_Shareholder: Globe score Shareholder Rights category (/31) 
Globe_Comp: Globe score Shareholding and Compensation category (/26) 
Globe_Disclosure: Globe score Voluntary Disclosures category (/12) 
DisclosuresOnly: Score of PDScore items that only deal with disclosures 
PoliciesPractices: Score of PDScore items that encompass policies and/or practices 
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Chapter 3: 
 
Politically Connected Directors and Corporate Governance 
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Abstract 
 
Research has shown that firms can benefit when they are politically connected. The extant 
literature has shown that politically connected firms benefit from procurement contracts, reduced 
regulatory issues and lower costs of capital. However, with more politicians joining corporate 
boards, the effect of political connectedness on corporate governance remains unclear. This 
paper examines the association between politically connected directors and corporate 
governance. A sample of high ranking politicians that have joined firm boards of directors is 
examined. I find that firms with politician directors have higher corporate governance scores. 
Additional tests also indicate that an addition of a politician to a board of directors increases the 
governance quality. 
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I. Introduction 
  Politicians often have the power and influence to benefit corporations. In 2007, Tenet 
Healthcare was suffering through regulatory and reputational problems, when it decided to 
appoint former Governor Jeb Bush and former Senator Bob Kerrey to its board of directors. By 
2009, the corporation was the second best performing stock on the S&P 500 for the year and has 
since become one of the largest healthcare companies in the United States (Krantz, 2010). In 
contrast, in the midst of the Chesapeake Energy scandal—where the company failed to disclose 
the CEO’s questionable financial practices—were two powerful ex-politicians. Senator Don 
Nickles and Governor Frank Keating enjoyed several perks, such as access to the firm’s private 
planes for travel, while failing to maintain their fiduciary duty (McIntyre & Zajac, 2012). 
However, while more attention is paid to scandals regarding governance failures, these directors 
were likely an anomaly compared to the many politicians sitting on boards that bring value to 
firms. Thus, this paper empirically examines the association between politicians on corporate 
boards and corporate governance. 
 Academics, the business media and governance experts have started to take a closer look 
at ex-politicians sitting on corporate boards. While there has been an increasing amount of 
literature recently regarding politically connected firms, the extant literature has tended to focus 
on countries with underdeveloped financial markets or in highly corrupt political environments. 
However, political figures, albeit often retired from public office, being nominated to board 
positions in the United States is becoming more common. Politicians identified in this paper are 
those that have sat on high level public positions, such as former presidential candidates, 
senators, congressmen, big city mayors, governors, secretaries, and ambassadors. These 
politicians are independent directors and are less likely to have direct business connections than 
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other outside directors. 
  To date, the extant literature on director nominations often takes a resource dependence 
view (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The board of directors can be viewed as a linking instrument 
between the organization and the external environment. Political leaders (who can be classified 
as community influence type directors) often have different background than other types of 
board members (business experts/insiders, support specialists). However, these politicians share 
many of the same traits, skills, and previous job experiences as other corporate directors. These 
directors are often high profile and have been shown to help business procure government 
contracts, reduce borrowing costs, and allow firms to benefit from becoming more tax aggressive 
(Chaney et al., 2011; Goldman et al., 2013; Kim & Zhang, 2016).  
 Data was collected from management information circulars (proxy statements), 
Compustat, CRSP and ISS/RiskMetrics, for the years 2007 to 2012. 6372 firm-years are 
examined and show that 29% of listed firms in the sample have or had at least one politician on 
its board of directors. Furthermore, these politically connected firms tend to have different firm 
and governance characteristics than their counterparts. However, there is little difference in their 
performance characteristics. 
  Utilizing the Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk et al., 2009), this paper hypothesizes and 
finds that firms with politician directors are associated with higher corporate governance scores. 
This relationship persists after controlling for firm-level, performance, and other governance 
based variables. The paper also documents that firms which add former politicians to their board 
of directors improve their corporate governance quality. Dropping politicians from boards has 
minimal or a negative effect on governance quality. Additional testing, including a propensity 
scoring matching model and difference-in-differences, provide support for these hypotheses. 
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  This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature and to the diverse research 
field of politically connected firms. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper 
to examine the connection between politicians as directors and corporate governance quality, 
using a relatively large sample size. While previous literature has focused on the performance 
effects of being politically connected, this paper finds that adding politicians to corporate boards 
can also be an effective governance mechanism. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents background 
information regarding boards of directors and political connections. Hypotheses development is 
described in the third section. Section four outlines the research methodology. Results are 
reported in the fifth section. Section six provides additional testing. The final section of the paper 
concludes the study. 
 
II Background 
Prior Literature on Politically Connected Firms 
  Watts and Zimmerman’s (1978) influential paper on Positive Accounting Theory put 
forward the political cost hypothesis. Their model demonstrated that firms may use accounting 
methods to lower profits so as not to attract the attention of politicians. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) put forward an alternative model where politicians will extract rents from politically 
connected firms. Firms are able to enhance their value when the benefits of these connections 
outweigh their rents (costs). However, when there is the potential for political exploitation, firms 
often can take steps towards mitigate these risks, such as hiring high quality auditors (Gul, 2006). 
  Much of the extant literature has examined firms with political connections in emerging 
or corrupt markets, often in both. These studies have mainly focused on politician ownership of 
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firms or politicians in high management positions, with only a few focusing primarily on the 
board of directors. Furthermore, these papers tend to focus on countries with underdeveloped 
financial markets or in highly corruption political environments (Carretta et al., 2012). For 
instance, in emerging markets and highly corrupt countries, Faccio et al. (2006) find that firm 
value increases when an entrepreneur is elected to a top political position. Asian studies have 
shown that politically connected firms are often given special privileges by the government 
(Effiezal Aswadi et al., 2011). In recent years, a number of studies have examined the political 
connectivity of Chinese firms since the country’s move towards privatization. Fan et. al. (2007) 
find that politically connected CEOs have poorer post-IPO stock performance and that these 
firms are more likely to appoint other bureaucrats, rather than directors with relevant 
professional backgrounds, to the board of directors. Private Chinese firms with politically 
connected managers are more likely to obtain government subsidies (Wu et al., 2012), are more 
likely to expropriate from minority shareholders (Cheung et al., 2010; Qian et al., 2011) and are 
less likely to be forced to resign than poorer performing state owned firms (Chang & Wong, 
2009). 
 In the United States, it is rare for an active or former politician to obtain control of a 
corporation or the CEO position in a firm. However, politicians being nominated to board 
positions is becoming more prevalent. Politically connected firms are most likely to occur in 
regulated industries (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001). At the same time, these companies often need 
to improve their accounting transparency and are more likely to hire a Big Four auditor 
(Guedhami et al., 2014). Additional studies on politically connected firms have shown that these 
firms are more likely to receive corporate bailouts and more preferential treatment in 
procurement contacts (Faccio et al., 2006; Lenway & Rehbein, 1991). 
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  However, few papers have examined how politician directorships affect the corporate 
governance of firms in developed markets. A seminal study in this literature by Goldman et al. 
(2009) did find that politically connected director nominations are associated with significant 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in the United States, although the study focused mainly on 
CARs around the time of presidential elections. Nonetheless, both Republican and Democratic 
affiliated board nominations were found to have significant effects. Other papers on politically 
connected firms have shown that political connections, and especially politically connected 
directors, can be extremely beneficial to firms. Hillman (2005) finds that firms with ex-
politicians on the board of directors are associated with better market-based performance, 
especially in heavily regulated industries. Similarly, the cost of bank loans is significantly lower 
for companies that have board members with political ties (Houston et al., 2014).  
Director Nominations 
  Since Fama and Jensen (1983) a great deal of research and regulation has focused on the 
board of directors, as they play a vital role in monitoring management, setting policies and 
reducing agency conflicts.  Rather than just playing an advisory role, directors are often needed 
to facilitate better access to important resources in the firm's external environment (Pfeffer, 
1972). This includes providing direct connections to important stakeholders (Mizruchi, 1996) 
such as creditors, customers and the government. Furthermore, board members are often 
nominated as a means for a firm to gain legitimacy. Thus, firms tend to hire high profile directors 
as a credible signalling mechanism to the market (Deutsch & Ross, 2003). 
  Directors are often nominated by the nominating committee of a board, although CEOs 
often have a considerable amount of influence over the process (Zajac & Westphal, 1996). To 
ensure the quality of the board, directorships are recommended to be staffed with independent, 
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experienced and knowledgeable members (Vafeas, 1999). Once a nomination is made, 
shareholders then ratify director candidates selected by the board itself. Director nomination 
candidates are rarely voted down by shareholders, unless there is an ongoing proxy battle - often 
caused by institutional investors (MacGregor & Campbell, 2008). Furthermore, it has been noted 
that directors can be categorized into four types: insiders (e.g. current or former firm executives), 
business experts (e.g. CEOs or directors of other firms), support specialists (e.g. lawyers and 
bankers) and community influencers (e.g. political leaders and university faculty) (Hillman et al., 
2000). Thus, unlike the first three categories where the directors often have significant business 
experience, politicians are nominated for alternative reasons. 
 
III Hypotheses Development 
Resource Dependence and Other Theories 
  The board of directors can be seen as a linking instrument between the organization and 
the external environment. Resource dependence theory is often employed in political 
connectedness research to explain why firms become politically connected and nominate former 
politicians to their boards. Resource dependence theory, as posited by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978), argues that interdependent relationships are needed by organizations in order to both 
reduce uncertainty and enhance power. To minimize conflicts, an organization will often 
nominate a representative of the source of the constraint onto its governing board. Although the 
organization might forgo some of its autonomy, an individual appointed to a board is expected to 
support and aid the organization in its problems (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
  Based on resource dependence theory, Kim and Zhang (2016) show that politically 
connected firms, including those with politicians as board members, are associated with (and 
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benefit from) tax aggressiveness. Likewise, Chaney et al. (2011) find that while the cost of debt 
is higher for firms with lower quality reported earnings, politically connected firms are able to 
report poorer quality earnings without a negative effect to their cost of debt. Thus, the academic 
literature has begun to demonstrate that nominating politicians to the board of directors can be an 
efficient strategy for enhancing corporate outcomes. 
  Other theories have also been proposed to explain the emergence of politically connected 
firms. Agency theory deals with potential conflicts between political directors and management 
(e.g. Ellstrand, et al., 2002; Lee. et al., 2014). Embeddedness theory takes an economic-
sociological perspective in studying inter-organization costs and constraints when politicians are 
involved (Siegel, 2007; Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Exchange theory in this literature describes the 
interdependence of suppliers and demanders of public policy (Schuler et al., 2002). Finally, some 
studies have taken more of a philosophical approach, such as a Confucian perspective for 
political appointments (Li & Liang, 2015) or ethical perspectives, such as how political 
connections relate to corporate social responsibility (Li & Zhang, 2010).  
Former Politicians as Corporate Directors 
 Successful high level politicians share many of the same traits as corporate directors. Namely, 
their job requires them to be accountable (both professionally and legally) and be performance 
orientated along with having strong leadership, decision making, and communication skills 
(Romzek, 2000). Moreover, previous government experience allows them to provide valuable 
advice and counsel regarding the public policy environment of a firm. This includes, “channels 
of communication to existing government officials, bureaucrats, and other political decision 
makers; influence over political decisions; and legitimacy” (Lester et al., 2008). Moreover, 
politicians are independent directors and are less likely to have direct business connections than 
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other outside directors. These directors also have a high reputation to keep and, with their public 
profiles, are more likely to be scrutinized than other directors—incentives to avoid poor 
governance practices. 
 Directors are directly linked with the setting, monitoring, and reviewing of all top level 
corporate policies and decisions. The argument can be made that firm performance is positively 
associated with good corporate governance quality (Gao, et al., 2016; Gompers et al., 2003; 
Ueng, 2016, among others). Nonetheless, the aforementioned literature generally suggests that 
politicians on boards of directors do benefit corporations in multiple ways. For example, studies 
of the university faculty, the other community influencer type of director, have shown that 
professors in the boardroom have positive effects on the corporate governance of firms (Francis 
et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2016). 
  As resource dependence theory suggests, firms will bring in resources, such as directors, 
to manage uncertainty, especially when dealing with governments or regulators (Pfeffer, 1987). 
The aforementioned extant literature demonstrates that politicians are an effective human 
resource, especially when dealing with government intervention or regulatory issues- which high 
level politicians often have a comprehensive understanding on the policy and regulatory 
processes. Ex-politicians as directors are an important source of human and social capital (Lester 
et al., 2008) and are known to provide firms with important expertise on legislative and 
bureaucratic procedures (Goldman et al., 2009). Furthermore, these politicians have the 
knowledge and experience on how to appease constituents (a.k.a. shareholders). Thus, the 
hypotheses are provided in alternative form: 
  H1: Firms with former politicians on their board of directors are associated with  
            higher quality corporate governance. 
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  H2: Firms that add former politicians to their board of directors improve their  
            corporate governance quality. 
 
IV Method 
  The data collected in this paper derives from management information circulars (proxy 
statements), Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)/RiskMetrics, Compustat and the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases. Prior studies have utilized various measures and 
model specifications to measure political connectedness. For instance, campaign contributions, 
lobbying expenditures, or authors have created their own political alignment indexes. Here, only 
board members with prior political experience are examined, as directors are directly linked with 
the setting, monitoring, and reviewing of all top level corporate policies and decisions.
25
 
  The sample begins with all firms that contain data from 2007 to 2012 in ISS. Firms that 
do not have the necessary information in ISS/Riskmetrics, proxy statements from EDGAR (the 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system) or Compustat are removed due of 
insufficient data. Similarly, trusts, which have different governance structures, and government 
sponsored entities (such as Fannie Mae), which are politically connected by design, were taken 
out of the sample. This left a total of 6372 firm-year observations. The detailed sample 
description is presented in Table 1. 
     [Insert Table 1 here] 
  Politicians are identified by the Goldman et al. (2009) method via a textual analysis. The 
proxy statements for all of the firms in the sample are downloaded from EDGAR and entered 
into a java-based program co-developed by the author. Next, all of the proxy statements are 
                                                          
25
 This is one of the most popular measures of political connectedness (see. Goldman et al., 2009; Duchin & 
Sosyura, 2012; Kostovetsky, 2015). 
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analyzed and a company is classified as politically connected if it has at least one board member 
with one of the following former positions: president, presidential (vice-presidential) candidate, 
senator, member of the House of Representatives, (assistant) secretary
26
, deputy secretary, 
deputy assistant secretary, undersecretary, associate director, governor, director (CIA, FEMA), 
deputy director (CIA, Office of Management and Budget), commissioner (IRS, NRC, SSA, 
FDA, SEC), ambassador, mayor, White House staff, chairman of the presidential election 
campaign, and chairman or member of the president’s council. During this process, each result 
was manually checked (by reading through the proxy statement) to determine whether or not the 
result was referring to a director’s past position. 
To test whether these firms also have provisions that enable them to be entrenched, Bebchuk et 
al.’s (2009) Entrenchment Index27 (E Index) was utilized.28 The E index is a subset of Gompers 
et al.’s (2003) Governance Index (G Index), based on what Bebchuk et al. (2009) identified as 
the six most important corporate governance items. These six corporate governance provisions 
that determine whether a board is entrenched are: a staggered board, limits to amend bylaws, 
limits to amend charter, supermajority voting rules, golden parachutes and poison pills. All of the 
governance provisions are provided in the ISS/RiskMetrics data and the E Index is calculated 
from there. Prior studies that have used the Entrenchment Index as a proxy for corporate 
governance have shown that firms which score higher on the E Index are associated with lower 
                                                          
26
 All secretary positions refer to federal executive departments of the United States 
27
 As posited by Manne (1965) and Shleifer and Vishny (1989), management entrenchment occurs when 
management and the board are given the power to make firm- level decisions that decreases the likelihood of being 
forced to vacate their position. This includes protecting against mergers, acquisitions, hostile takeovers or other 
events that may disrupt their power. Shareholders may be harmed by management shirking, empire-building or 
extraction of benefits such as higher compensation. Entrenchment is known to cause agency problems with negative 
valuation consequences (Zerni et al., 2010). However, entrenchment is not necessarily associated with CEO tenure, 
as many long tenured executives hold on to their positions due to valid reasons, such as superior performance. 
Rather it is a corporate governance concept that focuses on (poor) alignment between management and shareholder 
interests. 
28
 This study utilizes the E Index as a proxy for corporate governance quality and does not attempt to make a direct 
connection between political directors and management entrenchment.  
74 
 
creditor ratings, excessive CEO compensation, tax aggressiveness and lower firm valuations (see 
Alali et al., 2012; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Francis et al., 2013; Hoppe & Moers, 2011; Skantz, 
2012; Veld & Wu, 2013). 
  The following regression was then performed: 
  E Indexit = α0it + α1PoliticianOnBoardit + ∑Controlsit + μit             Eqn. (1) 
 where Entrenchment Index is the dependent variable and lower scores suggest higher corporate 
governance quality. 
Characteristics of the Board 
  Various studies have examined the corporate governance effects of age and other board 
composition variables. Hunt and Jennings (1997) show that younger aged managers tend to make 
the most unethical decisions. Similarly, older, more educated and female managers are found to 
be more ethical than their counterparts and may reduce firm level risk (Deshpande, 1997). CEO 
age is also positively associated with financial reporting quality (Huang et al., 2016), although 
CEOs acquire more power over time by participating in the appointment of board members and 
once they pass their first five years in office, their dismissal likelihood declines (Shen & 
Cannella, 2002). Kim and Zhang (2016) note that firms with politicians as board members often 
pay less taxes. Older directors on the audit committee are negatively related to the cost of equity 
capital (Dao et al., 2013). However, Ali et al. (2014) find mixed results when testing between 
board age diversity and performance. When prior firm performance is better, the former CEO is 
more likely to be retained on the board (Evans et al., 2010). Finally, busy and long tenured 
directors may be associated with governance problems (Niu & Berberich, 2015). 
Controls in this study include: Size, which is measured using the natural log of the total assets of 
a corporation. ROA measures the return on assets for the firm in the current year. Book-to-market 
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is calculated as the book value of equity, excluding preferred shares, divided by the market value 
of the firm on the balance sheet date. Leverage is measured as a firm’s total debt divided by its 
total assets. Firm Age is measured as the number of data years (as a public company) available 
on CRSP.
29
 Cash Effective Tax Rate is calculated as the amount of tax paid in cash divided by 
the firm’s net income. GAAP Effective Tax Rate is also run as a tax avoidance substitute for Cash 
ETR. Other governance variables related to the structure of the board are also controlled for: 
Board Size measures the size of the board of directors, divided by the natural log of the total 
assets.  Independent Chair is also a dummy variable, with a value of one if the chairman of the 
board was independent from the CEO and zero otherwise. Female Directors measures the 
percentage of directors on the board that are female. CEO Age is the age of the chief executive 
officer on the proxy statement date—including Young CEO if the CEO is younger than fifty 
years of age and Old CEO if the CEO is sixty years of age or older—while CEO Tenure is the 
number of years as chief executive officer on the same date. Directors’ Average Age measures 
the average age of all the directors (endogeneity testing is done to measure the average age 
without the politicians and/or CEOs). Finally, Busyness or busy directors measures the average 
number of other public directorships per board member.  
A similar regression to Eqn (1) is then performed to determine whether there are any incremental 
effects from adding or dropping politicians from the board of directors: 
         E Indexit = α0 + α1PoliticianOnBoardit + α2Add_politicianit +  
   α3Drop_politicianit +∑Controlsit + μit                          Eqn. (2) 
where Add_politician is an indicator value of one if a politician has been added to the board of 
directors, zero otherwise and Drop_politician is an indicator value of one if a politician has been 
                                                          
29
 The CRSP database only goes back to 1925. 34 (3.2%) of the firms in the sample have the maximum value of 82-
87 years. The results are unchanged when the natural log of firm age is substituted. 
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dropped from the board of directors, zero otherwise. All non-indicator variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels for the two equations. Finally, to address the issue of independence in 
time-series data, robust standard errors are required. Thus, the regressions are run with standard 
errors clustered by firm. 
 
V Results 
 Table 2 shows the distribution of politicians over the 2007-2012 sample periods. 
Approximately 24% of the firms had at least one politician on its board of directors. The number 
of politically connected firms, and total number of politicians on boards, increased by about five 
percent over the sample period. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A 
provides the descriptive statistics for all the firms in the sample. Additional analysis shows that 
approximately 29% (304/1062) of the firms in the sample had a politician on its board of 
directors for at least one of the sample years. Descriptive statistics in Panel B show firms with 
political directors have higher corporate governance (lower Entrenchment Index scores). 
Consistent with the extant literature (e.g. Kim & Zhang, 2016), these firms are also significantly 
larger than firms without a former politician on its board of directors. The “political firms” are 
significantly older, have larger boards as well as retain a higher percentage of female directors. 
Politician on Board firms are more likely to be audited by the Big 4 versus the control group 
(consistent with Guedhami et al., 2014). Furthermore, the “political boards” are older, but with 
directors having shorter average tenures on those boards, and with outside directors hold 
significantly more other directorships. Finally, consistent with Faccio (2010) and other studies, it 
was found that politically connected firms are more leveraged than non-politically connected 
firms.  
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      [Insert Table 2 here] 
     [Insert Table 3 here]  
  Table 4 presents the correlations matrix. The maximum correlation is between Size and 
Board Size at 0.625, while the minimum correlation is between ROA and book-to-market 
valuation at -0.58. Consistent with expectations, Politician on Board and the E Index are 
negatively correlated (p < 0.01). The E Index is positively correlated with a larger Board Size 
and a higher book-to-market valuation. It is negatively correlated with Size, older firms, return on 
assets, Female Directors, and Director Tenure. Meanwhile, Politician on Board is positively 
correlated with both firm Size and Board Size, along with Firm Age, higher Leverage, Female 
Directors, older CEOs, longer tenured directors and Busy Directors. Politician on Board has a 
negative correlation with a higher Book-to-market valuation, independent chair, younger CEOs 
and Director Age.
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     [Insert Table 4 here] 
  Table 5 presents the results of the regressions. The base model is shown in the first 
column, followed by Eqn (1) in the second column and Eqn (2) in the third column. The base 
model shows that there is a significant negative relationship (p < 0.01) between the E Index and 
Politician on Board (once again a lower index score shows higher governance quality). The full 
model shows that this significant relationship persists (p < 0.05) after controls are added. This is 
consistent with H1 (firms with a politician on the board of directors have superior corporate 
governance quality). The final column shows the incremental effect of adding or dropping 
politicians from the board of directors. There is a significantly negative (p < 0.05) relationship 
between the E Index and Add_politician, while there is no significant relationship between the E 
                                                          
30
 Also of note, the E Index has a very strong positive correlation with the G Index. This alternative index is explored 
further in section VI Additional Testing. 
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Index and Drop_politician. This provides some evidence to support H2 (adding a politician to 
the board improves governance quality). 
  The firm level variables show that larger firms have significantly lower governance 
scores (higher E Index), while higher leveraged and larger firms have significantly higher 
corporate governance scores (lower E Index). This is consistent with the notion that larger firms 
are under more scrutiny and more leveraged firms are riskier. Similarly, higher Book-to-Market 
firms (lower market valuation) are positively associated with the E Index. As can be expected 
when it comes to governance quality, the governance variables show that larger boards have 
significantly more entrenchment provisions, while boards with an independent chairperson have 
less provisions/higher governance scores. Finally, boards with older (on average) directors have 
significantly lower corporate governance quality. 
     [Insert Table 5 here] 
 
 VI Additional Testing  
Propensity Score Matching 
  Following Armstrong, Jagolinzer, and Larcker (2010), an ordered logistic-propensity 
score model was run, which models the probability that the EIndex will be affected by whether a 
firm has Politicians on Board. Matched pairs are formed by selecting an observation politically 
connected firm and matching it with a non-politically connected firm with the closest propensity 
score, based on size, industry and year, from the control group. This is performed with no 
replacement. Results are presented in Table 6. Similar to the ttest and the other linear models, the 
average treatment effect (ATT) of adding a politician to the board of directors shows a negative 
relationship between Politician on Board and the E Index. A regression run with the matched 
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pairs also documents this relationship (p < 0.05). This provides additional support for H1. 
     [Insert Table 6 here]  
Difference-in-Differences 
  A difference-in-differences design is also used to analyze the comparisons of the EIndex 
around the year of an additional or withdrawal of a politician to a company’s board of directors. 
Here the control firms are those that have not added (or dropped) a politician to its board of 
directors from 2008-2012. Table 7 reports mean values of across the baseline (2007-2011) and 
follow-up periods (2008-2012). During the sample period, 117 firms added a politician to its 
board, while 92 politicians were dropped from boards of directors. Panel A shows that there is a 
significant governance quality increase (lower score) in the EIndex after a politician joins a 
board. Meanwhile, Panel B shows that there is a significantly governance quality decrease 
(higher score) in the EIndex after a politician is dropped from a board. This provides additional 
support for H2. 
     [Insert Table 7 here]  
Governance Index as a lagged indicator 
  To address the possibility that politicians on board effect future governance quality, the 
following regressions were also run: 
 E Indexit+1 = α0it + α1politicianonboardit + ∑Controlsit + μit             Eqn. (3) 
where the Entrenchment Index is now one year forward. Table 8 presents the results. The results 
are consistent with the main regression. The negative relationship between the EIndex and 
PoliticianOnBoard is still significant (p < 0.05), once again, implying higher governance quality. 
This provides support for both of the hypotheses. Further endogeneity testing is performed with 
distance to Washington, D.C. employed as an instrumental variable for PoliticianOnBoard. 
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Distance to Washington, D.C. is often used as an instrumental variable in the political 
connections literature (for example Houston et al., 2014; Kim & Zhang, 2016).  DistanceDC is 
measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the distance from a firm’s headquarter to 
Washington, D.C. There is no reason that this excluded variable would have a direct impact on 
the E Index. A Heckman two-stage regression and a two-stage least squares regression are run. 
Untabulated results from the Heckman two-stage regression shows that the instrumental variable 
for PoliticianOnBoard is still significant (p < 0.05), however none of the variables are significant 
in the two-stage least squares model.  
     [Insert Table 8 here]  
Alternative Governance Index Measures 
  In Bebchuk et al. (2009), the authors measure the entrenchment index both as a raw score 
and as an indicator variable. Consistent with their approach, Eqn. (1) is rerun with a logistic 
regression. In this model a firm has a value of 1 if the E Index is equal or greater than two. The 
results are presented in Table 9. The results show that PoliticianOnBoard has a significant 
negative relationship with the E Index (p < 0.01), providing additional support for H1. The rest 
of the results are essential the same as the main regression, except for three variables (Book-to-
market, IndChair and Director’s Age) which show lower significance.  
     [Insert Table 9 here]   
  As an alternative to the E Index, Gompers et al.’s (2003) (G Index) is utilized. The G 
Index identifies 24 governance provisions that proxy for shareholder rights. These are sorted into 
five categories: 1) Delay (provisions intended to delay hostile takeover bidders); 2) Voting 
(provisions dealing with shareholder voting rights); 3) Protection (provisions protecting directors 
and officers); 4) State (state takeover laws); and 5) Other (provisions related to takeover 
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defenses). Prior studies that have used the Governance Index as a proxy for corporate 
governance have shown that firms that score higher on the G Index are associated with earnings 
management, higher underwriting fees, less investment in R&D and reduced capital 
expenditures, and an increased risk of default (see Cao et al., 2015; Chakraborty & Sheikh, 2010; 
Jiraporn et al., 2008; Lin & Ulupinar, 2013).  The score is calculated from the ISS/RiskMetrics 
data and the regression is clustered for standard errors. The G Index is substituted for the E Index 
as follows:  
 G Indexit = α0it + α1politicianonboardit + ∑Controlsit + μit             Eqn. (4) 
  Table 10 presents the results of this regression. Although the two indices are significantly 
correlated with each other, the negative relationship documented by Politician on Board and the 
G Index is not significant here. One possible explanation is provided by Bebchuk et al. (2009), 
which states that the G Index has several unnecessary provisions. Similar to the main models, 
there is a positive association between both Leverage and Board Size with the index. Unlike the 
previous models, Female and Busy Directors are positively associated with the G Index.  
     [Insert Table 10 here]  
 
VII Conclusion 
  Prior research has shown that politically connected firms help business procure 
government contracts, obtain financing, and allow firms to become more tax aggressive. Former 
politicians joining corporate boards have been linked to abnormal positive stock returns, reduced 
borrowing costs and overall increase market based performance. Nevertheless, the association 
between politician directors and corporate governance remains unclear. 
  This paper hypothesizes and finds that firms with politician directors are associated with 
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higher corporate governance scores. This relationship persists after controlling for firm-level, 
performance, and other governance based variables. A propensity scoring matching model and 
employing the index as a lagged variable confirms the results. Difference-in-differences 
regressions show that adding a politician to a board of directors is positively associated with 
governance quality, while dropping a politician from a board of directors is negatively associated 
with governance quality. Causality cannot be implied since the antecedents and determinants of 
why firms hire politicians are not empirically tested in this paper. However, the results, 
combined with the extant literature, do imply that successful politicians as directors enhance 
corporate governance.  
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Table 1: Sample Description 
 
Number of firm-year observations from ISS/RiskMetrics 
 
8815 
 
Less: Firms with missing data 
 
(1555) 
 
Less: Trusts and government sponsored entities 
 
(192) 
 
Less: Firms with missing EDGAR or Compustat data  
 
(696) 
 
Final Sample 
 
6372 
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Table 2: Politicians by Year 
 
 
Year # of Firms with 
Politician on Board  
% of Firms with 
Politician on Board 
Total # of Politicians 
on Boards 
2007 241 22.7% 320 
2008 246 23.2% 323 
2009 254 23.9% 337 
2010 262 24.7% 350 
2011 255 24.0%  339 
2012 253 23.8% 335 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Entire Sample 
Variable Mean Min 25% Median 75% Max 
Politician on 
Board 
 
0.237 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
GIndex 7.329 0 6 7 9 16 
EIndex 2.643 0 2 3 4 6 
Size 8.204 5.079 6.989 8.037 9.285 12.710 
Firm Age 29.684 1 15 24 40 87 
Leverage 0.556 0 0.405 0.558 0.704 0.998 
Big4 0.985 0 1 1 1 1 
ROA 0.040 -0.345 0.014 0.047 0.085 0.560 
BKMK 0.628 -0.011 0.325 0.513 0.777 2.129 
Cash ETR  0.227 0 0.067 0.217 0.327 1 
Board Size 9.561 4 8 9 11 18 
IND Chair 0.479 0 0 0 1 1 
Female 
Directors 
0.127 0 0 0.110 0.200 0.570 
CEO Age 57.039 35 52 57 61 91 
CEO Tenure 9.840 1 4 7 13 39 
Directors’ 
Age 
62.279 46 59.9 62.4 64.6 77.9 
Directors’ 
Tenure 
9.118 1 6.5 8.5 11 20.7 
Busy Director 1.065 0 0.5 0.8 1.2 2.6 
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Panel B: Differences between Politician on Board and No Politician Firms 
Variable Politician on Board 
Mean  
(n=1511) 
No Politician 
Mean  
(n=4861) 
T-test  between 
Groups 
Gindex 7.279 7.488 -2.49*** 
EIndex 2.493 2.689 -4.74*** 
Size 9.094 7.927 24.34*** 
Firm Age 36.267 27.637 14.91*** 
Leverage 0.614 0.537 11.27*** 
Big4 0.985 0.938 7.36*** 
ROA 0.048 0.037 1.35 
BKMK 0.583 0.643 -2.19** 
Cash ETR  0.228 0.226 0.40 
Board Size 10.525 9.261 18.44*** 
IND Chair 0.393 0.506 -7.70*** 
Female Directors 0.145 0.121 8.35*** 
CEO Age 57.367 56.938 2.10** 
CEO Tenure 9.604 9.914 -0.34 
Directors’ Age 63.166 62.003 10.72*** 
Directors’ Tenure 8.704 9.247 -3.82*** 
Busy Director 1.065 0.784 19.74*** 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable descriptions
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Table 4: Correlations Matrix 
 
 
* Significant at the 1% level 
See Appendix I for variable descriptions 
gindex    eindex  politician 
onboard 
 nlsize   firmage  leverage roa    bkmk 
 
cashetr    boardsize  indchair  femaledir  youngceo  oldceo directors 
  age  
  tenure  busyness 
gindex 1 
eindex 0.7444*  1 
politicianonboard 
 
 -0.0385*  -0.0616* 1 
nlsize 0.1204*  -0.0969*   0.2803*  1 
firmage 0.0208  -0.0329*   0.1303*   0.3428*   1 
leverage 0.1369* 0.0149    0.1514*   0.5338*   0.1992*   1 
roa  -0.0565*   -0.0668* -0.0069   -0.1349*  -0.0167   -0.3800* 1 
    bkmk 
 
0.0051    0.0457*  -0.0474*   0.0905* 0.0309   0.0554* -0.5826* 1 
cashetr 0.0178 0.0267 -0.0024   -0.0752*  -0.0411*  -0.1432* 0.3420*  -0.1637*  1 
boardsize 0.1646*   0.0472*   0.2277*   0.6251*   0.3531*   0.4062* -0.0974*    0.0535* -0.0239 1 
indchair -0.0275 -0.013   -0.0960*  -0.1288*  -0.1191*  -0.0710* -0.0296 -0.0018 -0.016   -0.0422*   1 
   femaledir 0.0540*  -0.0486*   0.1186*   0.2807*   0.1833*   0.2474* -0.0166   -0.0556* 0.0015    0.2835*  -0.0516* 1 
youngceo -0.0067 0.0203   -0.0403*  -0.0957*  -0.1551*  -0.0718* 0.0347*   -0.0632*   0.0408*  -0.0805*   0.1710*  -0.0327*   1 
oldceo -0.0166 -0.0112    0.0325* 0.0275    0.0894* -0.0226 -0.006    0.0563* -0.0026    0.0366*  -0.2216*  -0.0733*  -0.2803*   1 
directorsage  -0.0451*  -0.0423*   0.137*   0.0788*   0.19* 0.0123 -0.028   0.0903* -0.0042    0.1004*  -0.0615*  -0.1642*  -0.2420*   0.3137* 1 
     tenure  -0.0792* -0.0315   -0.0786*  -0.1067*   0.1378*  -0.1040* 0.0285 0.0315 0.015   -0.0377*  -0.0376*  -0.1708*  -0.1105*   0.1741* 0.4256*  1 
busyness 0.1324* -0.0219    0.2393*   0.3485*   0.2013*   0.1332* 0.0821*   -0.1563*  0.0153    0.2361*  -0.0507*   0.1782* -0.0199 -0.0316 -0.0142 -0.2753*  1 
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Table 5: Regression Results  
 
Model: E Indexit = α0it + α1PoliticianOnBoardit + ∑Controlsit + μit 
 
Variable OLS Coefficient 
(t-stat)  
EIndex 
OLS Coefficient 
(t-stat)  
EIndex 
OLS Coefficient 
(t-stat)  
EIndex 
Politician on Board 
 
-0.196*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.170** 
(-2.31) 
-0.154** 
(-2.04) 
Add_politician   -0.202** 
(-1.97) 
Drop_politician 
 
  -0.100 
(-0.83) 
Firm Level Variables 
Size 
  
-0.198*** 
(-7.50) 
 
-0.198*** 
(-7.47) 
Firm Age 
 
 -0.001 
(-0.40) 
-0.001 
(-0.37) 
Leverage  0.651*** 
(4.12)   
0.649*** 
(4.11)   
Performance Based 
Variables 
ROA 
  
0.207 
(0.73) 
 
0.203 
(0.71) 
BKMK  0.180*** 
(2.62) 
0.179*** 
(2.62) 
Cash ETR   -0.072 
(-0.70) 
-0.074 
(-0.70) 
Other Governance 
Variables 
Board Size 
  
0.095*** 
(6.20) 
 
0.096*** 
(6.24) 
IND Chair  -0.101** 
(-1.96) 
-0.102** 
(-1.97) 
Female Directors  0.313 
(1.12) 
0.306 
(1.09) 
Young CEO  -0.003 
(-0.04) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
Old CEO  -0.050 
(-0.93) 
-0.049 
(-0.91) 
Directors Average Age 
 
 0.025*** 
(2.66) 
0.024*** 
(2.64) 
Directors’ Tenure 
 
 -0.005 
(-0.51) 
-0.005 
(-0.53) 
Busy Director 
 
 -0.006 
(-0.09) 
-0.006 
(-0.10) 
Industry Effects  Yes Yes 
Year Effects  Yes Yes 
Observations 6372 6372 6372 
Adjusted R² 0.001 0.4135 0.4139 
 
  
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed 
tests. See Appendix I for variable descriptions  
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Table 6: Propensity Score Matching 
 
Model: p(PoliticianOnBoardit) = α0it + α1Sizeit + α2Industryit + α3Yearit + μit 
 
E Indexit = α0it + α1PoliticianOnBoardit + ∑Controlsit + μit 
Variable Sample Treated      Controls   Difference t-stat 
EIndex Unmatched 2.495 2.689 -0.194 -4.69*** 
 ATT 2.507 2.558 -0.122 -2.57** 
 
Variable 
 
OLS Coefficient 
(t-stat)  
 
 
Politician on Board 
 
-0.119** 
(-2.20) 
Firm Age 
 
-0.004*** 
(-2.95) 
Leverage -0.198 
(-1.36)   
Performance Based 
Variables 
ROA 
 
-2.522*** 
(-5.48) 
BKMK -0.115 
(-1.54) 
Cash ETR  0.404*** 
(2.95) 
Other Governance 
Variables 
Board Size 
 
0.026** 
(1.99) 
IND Chair -0.121** 
(-2.18) 
Female Directors 0.471** 
(2.23) 
Young CEO 0.099 
(1.63) 
Old CEO -0.069 
(-1.64) 
Directors Average Age 
 
0.080*** 
(12.00) 
Directors’ Tenure 
 
-0.039*** 
(-6.11) 
Busy Director 
 
0.367*** 
(8.60) 
Observations 3010 
Adjusted R² 0.0204 
 
     
      
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed 
tests. See Appendix I for variable descriptions   
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Table 7: Difference-in-Differences 
 
Panel A: E-Index, Politician Added to Board 
 
 Baseline Follow-up Diff-in-Diff 
(t-stat) 
Control Group N=6249 
(No Politicians Added) 
2.522 3.298  
Treatment Group N=117 
(Politician Added to Board) 
2.177 2.333  
 
Difference (T-C) 
(t-stat) 
 
-0.345** 
(-2.44) 
 
-0.965*** 
(-3.18) 
 
-0.619* 
(-1.85) 
 
R² 
 
0.04 
  
 
Panel B: E-Index, Politician Dropped from Board  
 Baseline Follow-up Diff-in-Diff 
(t-stat) 
Control Group N=6274 
(No Politicians Added) 
2.524 3.277  
Treatment Group N=92 
(Politician Dropped from 
Board) 
1.987 3.400  
 
Difference (T-C) 
(t-stat) 
 
-0.537*** 
(-3.40) 
 
0.123 
(0.34) 
 
0.092* 
(1.69) 
 
R² 
 
0.04 
  
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable descriptions  
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Table 8: Additional Regression Results 
 
Model: E Indexit+1 = α0it + α1politicianonboardit + ∑Controlsit + μit 
Variable OLS Coefficient 
(t-stat)  
EIndex 
Politician on Board 
 
-0.182** 
(-2.34) 
Firm Level Variables 
Size 
 
-0.207*** 
(-15.14) 
Firm Age 
 
-0.001 
(-1.52) 
Leverage 0.628*** 
(7.35)   
Performance Based 
Variables 
ROA 
 
-0.066 
(-0.31) 
BKMK 0.202*** 
(4.68) 
Cash ETR  0.020 
(0.26) 
Governance Variables 
Board Size 
 
0.090*** 
(6.31) 
IND Chair -0.114** 
(-2.07) 
Female Directors 0.410 
(1.37) 
Young CEO -0.016 
(-0.19) 
Old CEO -0.053 
(-0.89) 
Directors Average Age 
 
0.026*** 
(2.62) 
Directors’ Tenure 
 
-0.005 
(-0.48) 
Busy Director 
 
0.005 
(0.08) 
Industry Effects Yes 
Year Effects Yes 
Observations 5305 
Adjusted R² 0.3831 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed 
tests. See Appendix I for variable descriptions   
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Table 9: Logistic Regression Results  
 
Model: E Indexit = α0it + α1PoliticianOnBoardit + ∑Controlsit + μit 
 
Variable OLS Coefficient 
(t-stat)  
EIndex 
Politician on Board 
 
-0.368*** 
(-2.66) 
Add_politician  
Drop_politician 
 
 
Firm Level Variables 
Size 
 
-0.342*** 
(-6.27) 
Firm Age 
 
-0.001 
(-1.46) 
Leverage 1.011*** 
(3.03)   
Performance Based 
Variables 
ROA 
 
0.093 
(0.11) 
BKMK 0.289* 
(1.69) 
Cash ETR  -0.100 
(-0.40) 
Other Governance 
Variables 
Board Size 
 
0.135*** 
(4.28) 
IND Chair -0.147 
(-1.32) 
Female Directors 0.488 
(0.78) 
Young CEO 0.018 
(0.11) 
Old CEO -0.071 
(-0.62) 
Directors Average Age 
 
0.044** 
(2.21) 
Directors’ Tenure 
 
-0.018 
(-0.91) 
Busy Director 
 
-0.018 
(-0.14) 
Industry Effects Yes 
Year Effects Yes 
Observations 6372 
Pseudo R² 0.2340 
 
  
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed 
tests. See Appendix I for variable descriptions  
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Table 10: G-Index 
 
Model: G Indexit = α0it + α1PoliticianOnBoardit + ∑Controlsit + μit 
 
Variable OLS Coefficient 
(t-stat) 
 GIndex 
Politician on Board 
 
-0.129 
(-0.92) 
Firm Level Variables 
Size 
 
-0.053 
(-0.99) 
Firm Age 
 
-0.002 
(-0.65) 
Leverage 1.189*** 
(3.76)   
Performance Based 
Variables 
ROA 
 
0.015 
(-0.04) 
BKMK 0.163 
(1.24) 
Cash ETR  -0.138 
(-0.67) 
Governance Variables 
Board Size 
  
0.135*** 
(4.46) 
IND Chair -0.119 
(-1.17) 
Female Directors 1.367** 
(2.45) 
Young CEO -0.093 
(-0.65) 
Old CEO -0.078 
(-0.78) 
Directors Average Age 
 
0.029 
(1.57) 
Directors’ Tenure 
 
-0.002 
(-0.10) 
Busy Director 
 
0.394*** 
(3.22) 
Industry Effects Yes 
Year Effects Yes 
Observations 6372 
Adjusted R² 0.3047 
 
  
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level, two-tailed 
tests. See Appendix I for variable descriptions   
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Appendix I: Variable Definitions 
 
EIndex- Entrenchment Index, corporate governance measure of how many entrenchment 
provisions a company employs 
GIndex- Governance Index, corporate governance measure of how provisions limit shareholder 
rights 
Size- measured using the natural log of the total assets of a corporation.  
ROA measures the return on assets for the firm in the current year 
Firm Age- number of years as a public company 
Leverage - measured as a firm’s total debt divided by its total assets. 
Big 4- indicator variable of whether the company has a big four auditor 
ROA- Return on Assets, measures as net income divided by total assets 
Book-to-market- calculated as the book value of equity, excluding preferred shares, divided by 
the market value of the firm on the balance sheet date 
Cash ETR- Cash Effective Tax Rate, calculated as the amount of tax paid in cash divided by the 
firm’s net income 
Board Size- measures the size of the board of directors 
Independent Chair- indicator variable, with a value of one if the chairman of the board was 
independent from the CEO and zero otherwise 
Female Directors- measures the percentage of directors on the board that are female 
CEO Age- age of the chief executive officer on the proxy statement date 
CEO Tenure- number of years as chief executive officer on the proxy statement date  
Directors’ (Average) Age- measures the average age of the board of directors 
Directors’ Tenure- average number of years the directors have served on the board 
Busyness- average number of other public directorships per board member 
Politician on Board- Indicator variable if the firm had at least one politician on its board of 
directors 
Add_politician- indicator value of one if a politician has been added to the board of directors, 
zero otherwise 
Drop_politician- indicator value of one if a politician has been dropped from the board of 
directors, zero otherwise  
ATT- Average Treatment Effect of adding a politician to the board of directors.  
DistanceDC-  measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the distance from a firm’s 
headquarter to Washington D.C. 
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Chapter 4:  
 
The Value of Political Connections for Cross-Listed Firms 
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Abstract 
 
The extant literature has demonstrated that both political connections and cross-listing can 
benefit firms in various aspects, such as superior stock returns and a lower cost of capital. This 
paper examines whether cross-listed firms can obtain incremental financial benefits by also being 
politically connected. 142 Canadian cross-listed firms are examined to determine the extent of 
their political connections and to assess whether any incremental benefits are gained in 
politically connected cross-listed firms. The results show that politically connected cross-listed 
firms have higher analyst following, higher market valuations and greater market liquidity. 
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I. Introduction 
  While there are risks associated with being cross-listed or politically connected, such as 
increased business costs, increased regulatory attention, and risks of expropriation (Dodd, 2013; 
Doidge et al., 2004; Faccio, 2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978), many 
firms still choose to pursue these paths. Cross-listed firms benefit from increased analyst 
following (Baker et al., 2002), higher market valuations (Doidge et al., 2004), improved stock 
liquidity (Dodd, 2013) and a significant reduction in the cost of equity capital (Errunza & Miller, 
2000). Moreover, firms with political connections often benefit in similar ways by receiving 
preferential treatment from governments (Goldman et al., 2013; Khwaja & Mian, 2005). This 
paper examines whether cross-listed firms benefit from also being politically connected. 
  This study utilizes 142 Canadian firms which were cross-listed in the U.S. between 2010 
and 2014 and examines whether politically connected firms benefit from increased analysts’ 
coverage, increased market value, increased trading value, along with superior return on assets, 
return on equity and procurement contracts. Political connections are measured in three ways: 
lobbying, campaign contributions and political directors. The results show that compared to non-
politically connected cross listed firms, politically connected cross-listed firms have higher 
analyst following, higher market valuations, and higher liquidity and have significantly more 
government procurement contracts. To the author’s knowledge, this is one of the first papers to 
combine the political connectedness literature with the cross-listed literature. It contributes to the 
literature by demonstrating that political connections enhance the benefits firms receive from 
cross-listing. The findings are consistent with the recent literature that highlights the ongoing 
importance of political connections for firms. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The next section presents a literature 
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review on politically connected firms and cross-listed firms. Section three describes the research 
question and methodology. The results are reported in section four. Additional testing is done in 
section five. The final section of the paper discusses the findings of the study. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Politically Connected Firms 
   The extent of research regarding Politically Connected Firms (PCFs) is vast covering the 
areas of management, finance, economics as well as accounting. Early research in the field 
revealed that PCFs tend to be larger in size and more dependent on government regulation or 
contracts (Lenway & Rehbein, 1991). In relation to corporate political strategies, firms with 
larger market share are more involved (Schuler, 1996) and PCFs may benefit from reduced 
uncertainty and transaction costs as well as increased survival (Hillman et al., 1999). Rehbein 
and Schuler (1995) propose that firms with political experience, sufficient resources, unrelated 
diversification, and a high degree of stakeholder dependence should have the ability and 
willingness to engage in political activities. 
   Firms often use a combination of tactics to access politicians including contributing to 
political action committees, staffing offices in the capital city, and hiring lobbyists and political 
consultants (Schuler et al., 2002). Moreover, firms are devoting more resources to legislative 
activities, including hiring former politicians as outside directors for social and human capital 
reasons (Lester et al., 2008). However, while political activities can enhance firm profitability, 
Hadani and Schuler (2013) argue that political directors actually worsen firm performance. 
Chizema et al. (2015) contend that the executive pay-performance link is weaker with politically 
connected directors. 
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  Khwaja and Mian (2005) show that in a corrupt environment, PCFs receive preferential 
treatment and politicians extract up to two percent of the country’s GDP through rent-seeking 
measures. Similarly, Faccio (2006) documents that political connections between firms and 
governments are widespread across the world, especially prevalent in countries that are 
perceived highly corrupt, and in countries that impose restrictions on foreign investments and in 
larger size firms. On the other hand, Amore and Bennedsen (2013) present a unique study in 
Denmark, “arguably the least corrupt country in the world” (ibid., p. 387), and find that even in 
this environment having access to politicians significantly improves the performance of PCFs. 
 In a longitudinal U.S. study, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) find that stock market 
returns are significantly higher during the years of Democratic presidents compared to 
Republican presidents. On the other hand, following a Republican presidential win, Goldman et 
al. (2009) show that a portfolio of companies with Republican directors outperforms a portfolio 
of companies with Democratic directors. Similarly, procurement contracts are more likely to be 
awarded to PCFs with connections to the winning party (Goldman et al., 2013). Finally, Kim et 
al. (2012) argue that geographical proximity to successful politicians is related to superior stock 
returns.  
  Recent literature has shown that firms can also benefit when individual employees are 
politically connected. Individual contributions to politicians are directly related to greater 
operating performance, especially where there is greater industry clustering and those politicians 
are economically relevant (Ovtchinnikov & Pantaleoni, 2012). As Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) 
outline, mutual fund managers’ political orientation is a strong determinant of which companies 
they invest in. Conversely, Lee, Lee and Nagarajan (2014) reveal that when the political 
orientations of CEOs and independent directors are aligned, firms often suffer negative 
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consequences from this lack of diversity (lower firm valuations, lower operating profitability, 
lower CEO pay-performance sensitivity, etc.). 
Politically Connected Firms in the accounting literature 
  The influence of politicians on accounting standards has long been known and studied. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) presented the political-cost hypothesis, which examines the tax, 
regulatory, political and compensation implications of lobbying. Firms will use earnings 
management and other accounting methods to lower their income in situations where profits may 
attract the negative attention of politicians. Although not as popular as some of the other 
propositions Watts and Zimmerman put forward, other studies have, implicitly or explicitly, 
tested the political-cost hypothesis over the years. For example, Cahan (1992) investigates 
political agencies that rely on accounting earnings to enforce antitrust laws against monopolies. 
He finds that these firms use discretionary accruals to lower income in response to political costs. 
Similarly, PCFs rely on income decreasing discretionary accruals when outsourcing activities are 
a potential detriment (Ramanna & Roychowdhury, 2010). Finally, Mills et al. (2013) 
demonstrates that firms that receive federal contracts pay a higher amount of taxes, especially 
when political visibility is greater. 
  The accounting literature has documented many benefits from being politically 
connected. Houston et al. (2014) argue that political connections reduce the borrower’s cost of 
debt, thus increasing the value of PCFs and reducing monitoring costs and credit risk faced by 
banks. Correia (2014) finds that PCFs are less likely to face enforcement actions from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and suffer lower overall penalties. Likewise, Kim and 
Zhang (2016) show that when political connections mitigate enforcement actions, PCFs are more 
tax aggressive.  
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  The audit literature has also provided insights into how PCFs are valued and perceived. 
Gul (2006) demonstrates that PCFs are less profitable when government and regulators no longer 
provide favorable policies, which leads auditors to charge higher fees in order to mitigate the 
increased risk. However, these audit fees decrease once favorable policies return. Guedhami at 
al. (2014) argue that when there is the potential for political exploitation, firms turn to higher 
quality auditors to provide assurance to the market. 
  Internationally, authors have also examined how the cost of equity and the cost of debt 
relate to PCFs. In general, the accounting literature finds that lower quality accounting 
information is associated with a higher cost of debt. However, Chaney et al. (2011) find that 
PCFs can afford disclosing lower quality accounting information without it affecting the cost of 
debt. Moreover, Ben-Nasr et al. (2012) demonstrate that the cost of equity is higher for firms 
with government ownership, especially in less developed countries. 
  A wealth of studies has appeared in recent years examining China. The Chinese 
institutional environment is unique as privatization has been going on for the past two decades, 
but government influence is still vastly important. O’Connor et al. (2006) develop a model to 
illustrate how political constraints mediate economic liberalization forces. PCFs in China are 
more likely to list overseas (Hung et al., 2012) and are more likely to receive government 
subsidiaries (Lee, Walker & Zeng, 2014). Non-accounting research has also shown that while the 
risk of government expropriation is higher for PCFs, political connections are still important 
(Berkman et al., 2010; Cheung et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2014; Shibin et al., 2011). Meanwhile in 
Malaysia, Fung et al. (2015) argue that the more politically connected a firm is (proxied by the 
length of the relationship), the greater its performance is related to the performance of the 
government (i.e., election results).  
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Cross-listed firms 
 Similar to being politically connected, research has shown that firms can benefit from 
cross-listing. However, there are several reasons why a firm may not want to cross-list. The costs 
of cross-listing include a higher standard of disclosures, financial reporting, and compliance. 
There is also additional cost and time associated with the listing requirements. As well, increased 
scrutiny on the executives can lead to a loss of private benefits for management (Hope et al., 
2007). Thus, firms where the controlling shareholder has the opportunity to expropriate from the 
firm (or from minority shareholders) are significantly less likely to cross-list (Doidge et al., 
2004).  
  The extant literature in business has identified (and debated) several reasons why firms 
list on foreign exchanges. For instance, cross-listing is a way to overcome investment barriers, 
improve stock liquidity and gain access to a larger number of investors. Additionally, a cross-
listing decision may be an integral part of a firm’s global strategy (Dodd, 2013). Furthermore, 
Baker et al. (2002) assert that firms gain additional media coverage and the potential of more 
analysts’ coverage for cross-listed firms. Likewise, Lang et al. (2003) contend that firms which 
cross list in the U.S. have greater analyst coverage and increased forecast accuracy. 
  The legal bonding aspect of cross-listing states that firm-level risk can be reduced by 
complying with strict listing requirements of a foreign market. Additional mandatory disclosure 
requirements reduce information asymmetry between corporate managers and investors (Dodd, 
2013). Abdallah (2008) finds that firms with concentrated control, with a higher level of risk and 
those with more pronounced financing needs are more likely to cross-list on a market with better 
investor protection. Abdallaha and Ioannidisb (2010) later show that legal bonding has 
diminished over time as international markets have become more integrated. However, their 
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work also documents that market segmentation benefits (cross-listing to overcome investment 
barriers) have not diminished over time. 
  Along with market segmentation, there are several reasons why Canadian firms have the 
largest number of cross-listed shares on U.S. stock exchanges (King & Segal, 2009). 
Geographical proximity is an important determinant in cross-listing, with firms often listing in 
the nearest large market.
31
 This has led to an almost double number of listing in the United States 
since the early 1990s, with only a handful of Canadian corporations listing in Europe (Chouinard 
& D’Souza, 2004). Ammer et al. (2012) find that the most important determinant of the amount 
of U.S. investment a foreign firm receives is whether the firm cross-lists on a U.S. exchange. 
Firms that mandatorily adopt International Financial Reporting Standards exhibit significantly 
higher cross-listing propensity and benefit from higher creditor ratings when cross-listed (Chan 
et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2015). Finally, Doidge et al. (2004) contend that foreign firms with 
shares cross-listed in the U.S. had significantly higher Tobin’s Q than the non cross-listed firms 
from the same country. This suggests that the market favourably values cross-listed firms. 
However, it should be noted that Davis-Friday et al. (2005) document certain Mexican firms that 
chose to list in the U.S. had significantly weaker ex-post financial performances than non-cross-
listed Mexican firms that were eligible to cross-list. 
  Cross-listing in the U.S. by non-U.S. firms is associated with a significant reduction in 
the cost of equity capital (Errunza & Miller, 2000). Consistent with the predictions of market 
segmentation theory, Foerster and Karolyi (1999) report significant abnormal returns 
experienced by 153 firms from Canada, and other countries, when listed in U.S. markets. King 
and Segal (2009) document a permanent increase in the valuation of Canadian firms cross-listed 
in the U.S. for firms that attract and maintain investor recognition. Similarly, Doukas and 
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 For example, Irish firms listing in England, New Zealand firms listing in Australia. 
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Switzer (2000) and Mittoo (2003) find that Canadian firms experience significant positive 
abnormal returns around cross-listing in the U.S. However, Mittoo’s work also documents that 
Canadian firms strongly underperform the market in the years following the cross-listing. 
  Cross-listing generally improves the stock liquidity of Canadian firms that cross-list in 
the U.S. Foerster & Karolyi (1993) report an increase of 62 percent in total trading volume and 
an increase in domestic trading volume of 26 percent after cross-listing. Mittoo (1997) reports an 
increase in domestic trading volume of stocks listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange, but a 
decrease of those listed on the Vancouver Stock Exchange. Foerster & Karolyi (1998) documents 
that the total trading volume significantly increases, while trading volume on the home market 
decreased slightly, as some portion of trading activity migrated to the foreign market. They 
further show a significant decrease in trading costs, particularly for firms that have a significant 
portion of total trading activity taking place in the U.S. 
  Recent literature on cross-listed firms has examined cross-delisting. There are often 
surges and contradictions in host markets. Firms often enjoy the economic synergies of cross-
listing only when initially implemented under the most attractive conditions (Sarkissian & Schill, 
2016). However, when the market is no longer “hot”, and firms must deal with increased 
monitoring, disclosures and compliance costs, then they are nearly twice as likely to delist within 
three years (Yung et al., 2008).  
III. Research Question and Methodology 
  Both the decisions to become politically connected and cross-list are not haphazard, but 
require considerable strategic planning from management. The benefits from cross-listing 
include greater analyst following, improved stock liquidity and potentially greater stock 
performance. Furthermore, both political connections and cross-listing can benefit firms in 
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various aspects. For instance, both approaches can lead to a lower cost of capital and higher 
market valuations. On the other hand, the literature also shows that the benefits from both can 
quickly be diminished if there is a change in the political landscape or information environment. 
Similarly, the political connections and cross-listing branches of literature have shown some 
similar costs, such as increased public scrutiny. However, what is not yet known is whether firms 
can reap incremental benefits from being both cross-listed and politically connected. Is there any 
value for firms to choose to be both cross-listed and politically connected?  
  Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms may reap similar benefits from cross-listing and 
being politically connected. For instance, the aforementioned political-cost hypothesis (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978) describes conditions where firms generate increased attention. While firms 
often attempt to deter regulatory attention, increased attention in the form of analysts following 
and trading volume is often desirable for cross-listed firms. Similarly, many firms cross list in 
order to take advantage of profitable opportunities (Dodd, 2013). Political connections may 
allow firms to obtain a competitive advantage, especially through favorable policy or regulatory 
changes and profitable projects, such as government procurement contracts. Formally stated: 
Research Question: Do cross-listed firms benefit from also being politically connected? 
Data collection and models 
  Three of the most common methods to identify whether a firm is politically connected are 
by measuring whether a firm employs lobbyists, contributes to political campaigns or whether a 
firm has a politician on its board of directors. Bertrand et al. (2014) argue that corporations 
employ lobbyists for their political connections, rather than their expertise. Thus, classifying a 
firm as politically connected based on lobbying expenditures is often found in the literature 
(Correia, 2014). Cooper et al. (2010) argue that political contributions lead to significant future 
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abnormal returns.
32
 Similarly, other studies measure election and/or Political Action Committee 
(PAC) contributions as a proxy for political connectedness (Hong & Kostovetsky, 2012; Schuler 
et al., 2002). Finally, studies have shown that politicians with board memberships can utilize 
their connections to obtain governments support for firms (Duchin & Sosyura, 2012; 
Kostovetsky, 2015). 
  Data is collected for 142 Canadian cross-listed firms (entire population with available 
data) that were cross-listed between 2010 and 2014. The regression models are: 
  Analystsi,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Big4i,t + α4Leveragei,t + α5CapExpi,t +    
  α6Divsi,t + α7M&Aactivityi,t + α8Growthi,t + α9BKMKi,t + α10Lossi,t + α11Intangiblesi,t + 
  α12StockVolatilityi,t + α13StockReturni,t + industry&year effectsi,t + μ                              (1) 
  DVi,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Big4i,t + α4Leveragei,t + α5CapExpi,t +  
  α6Divsi,t + α7M&Aactivityi,t + α8Growthi,t +industry effects + year effectsi,t + μ             (2) 
where 
Analysts measures the average number of analysts following a company in a given year. This 
information is obtained from the I/B/E/S database. The dependent variable (DV) is one of the 
other aforementioned benefits from cross-listing and are defined as follows: Tobin’s Q is 
measured as the ratio of market value of assets divided by book value of assets. Volume refers to 
the yearly trading volume of the firm, measured as the log of total volume. ROA and ROE refer 
to the return on assets and return on equity, respectively.
33
 The latter four measures are obtained 
from Compustat. 
  The PCF measures are as follows: Lobbying measures whether or not the company has 
                                                          
32
 slightly better for firms that support Democratic candidates 
33 
ROA and ROE are measured as net profit over assets and equity. Thus, the minimum value is 0. This is done 
because there are several companies with no revenue in the sample and these extreme values would cause a negative 
skewness effect. 
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lobbying expenditures. (Campaign) Contributions measures whether or not a company 
contributes to a PAC, Super PAC or 527 organization.
34
 These two variables are obtained from 
opensecrets.org. (Political) Directors are identified through the Goldman et al. (2009) method, 
which identifies directors that have held prominent government positions. Politicians are 
identified as Canadian (domestic), American or International. This data primarily comes from 
proxy statements found on SEDAR. Consistent with the extant literature (Cooper et al, 2010; 
Goldman et al., 2009; Kim & Zhang, 2016; Yu & Yu, 2011), all three measures are indicator 
variables with a value of 0 or 1. Pol_sum is the summation of the three indicator variables. 
Pol_active measures whether the company had at least 1 firm year of lobbying, campaign 
contributions or political director in the sample period. 
  The control variables in the model follow Abdallah (2008). Although, since only one 
country (Canada) is being examined there is no need for country specific controls. Size is 
measured as the log of total assets. Big4 is an indicator variable if the company has a big four 
auditor. Leverage is calculated as total liabilities over total assets. Capital Expenditures 
(CapExp) are measured as the total capital expenditures for the year over total assets. Dividends 
(Divs) is an indicator variable of whether the firm paid out dividends in the year. M&Aactivity is 
also an indicator variable, examining whether the firm had a mergers and acquisitions event in 
the year. Finally, Growth refers to the year-over-year sales growth. This data was obtained from 
Compustat. 
  Additional controls are employed for Analysts. These variables come from the cross-
listed literature on financial analysts (Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Tan et al., 2011), once again 
excluding country specific controls. Book-to-market (BKMK) is calculated as the book value of 
                                                          
34
 Political Action Committee (PAC), independent-expenditure only committees (known as Super PACs) and 527 
organizations- tax-exempt organizations created primarily to influence the selection, nomination, election, 
appointment or defeat of candidate. Firms can contribute to these groups since 2010 - Citizens United v. FEC 
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equity, excluding preferred shares, divided by the market value of the firm on the balance sheet 
date. Loss is an indicator variable with a value of one if the firm had a net loss in the year. 
Intangibles are measured as the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. StockVolatility is the 
standard deviation of a firm’s stock in the prior year. Lastly, StockReturn is the return of a firm’s 
stock in the prior year. 
 
IV. Results  
 Table 1, Panel A shows descriptive statistics regarding political connections of the cross-
listed corporations. Among the three measures, politician directors is the most common (28% of 
firm-years) followed by lobbying (16%) and campaign contributions (15%). Approximately 28% 
of firms had political directors in the years captured (comparable to 29% of U.S. firms in Chapter 
3). A majority of these were domestic Canadian directors, 250 (74%) of the director years, 66 
(19%) were American political directors, while 24 (7%) of the director years were international 
(non-Canadian or U.S.). This is significantly more dispersed than the 99% of domestic (U.S.) 
directors in Chapter 3. Additional analysis shows that 41% of the firms were politically active at 
some point in the sample years (had at least one year of lobbying, political contributions or 
politician director). Approximately 5% of the sample had all three measures in a given year. Four 
firms (close to 3% of the sample) had lobbying, political contributions and politician directors in 
every year from 2010 to 2014. 
  Table 1, Panel B shows descriptive statistics regarding political connections of the cross-
listed corporations, broken down by year. The table shows that all three measures were almost 
complete uniform over the time period. This implies that the firms who employ these practices 
do so on a fairly consistent basis.
35
 The average lobbying and campaign contribution spending is 
                                                          
35
 Campaign Contributions in non-election years is based on the previous year. Almost all firms that contributed to 
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also presented. The campaign contributions reached the highest point in 2012-the year of the 
presidential election. Table 1, Panel C presents Spearman correlations of the three measures. 
Lobbying, political contributions and politician director are all significantly correlated to each 
other at the 1% level.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
  Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics and Table 3 shows the Spearman correlations 
for the model variables. The variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. To address the 
issue of independence in time-series data, robust standard errors often need to be controlled for. 
Thus, the regressions are run with standard errors clustered by firm. Several variables are 
significantly correlated with size. Possible multicollinearity issues are dealt with in the following 
Additional Testing section. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
 The regression results begin with Table 4 that gives the results with Analysts following as 
the dependent variable. The control variables are as one would expect in the literature, with Size 
having the strongest relationship with the number of analysts. Pol_sum and Pol_active are both 
significantly positively associated with Analysts (significant at the 1% level). Pol_sum and 
Pol_active are fairly consistent measures (with each other) throughout all the regressions. In the 
third column, both Lobbying and Contributions are significantly positively associated with 
analysts’ following (at the 1% and 5% levels, respectfully), while Directors is significantly 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
political campaigns did so consistently for all measurable years. 
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negative associated with analysts’ following (at 5% level). This latter relationship is explored 
further in section five. Nonetheless, this provides some evidence that political connections are 
associated with a greater analyst following in cross-listed firms. Size, StockVolatility and Divs 
are significantly positively associated with Analysts, as analysts tend to follow bigger firms that 
pay out dividends. Capexp is significantly negatively associated with Analysts, as these tend to 
be early, stage growth firms which analysts rarely follow. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 Table 5 shows the models regressed with Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. Consistent 
significant results are found with Pol_sum and Pol_active both having a significant positive 
relationship with Tobin’s Q (at the 1% level). Looking at the individual factors, Lobbying has no 
significant association, while Contributions and Directors are significantly positively associated 
with the Tobin’s Q (at the 1% and 5% levels, respectfully). Thus, the evidence presented 
suggests that political connections are associated with a high market valuation in cross-listed 
firms. Additionally, the market tends to speculate on growth firms, which is evidenced by Size 
being negatively associated with Tobin’s Q, while Leverage and Capexp are positively 
associated with Tobin’s Q (all at the 1% level).  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
  Table 6 shows the models with Volume as the dependent variable. Consistent significant 
results are shown with both Pol_sum and Pol_active having a significant positive relationship 
with trading volume. Looking at the individual factors, Lobbying has no association, while 
Contributions and Directors are significantly positively associated with Volume (at the 10% and 
5% levels, respectively). This provides evidence that political connections are associated with 
   
116 
 
higher market liquidity in cross-listed firms. Larger firms and those with a big four auditor are 
also positively associated with Volume.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
  Table 7 shows the models with ROA as the dependent variable. Pol_sum is not 
significantly associated with return on assets. This is further explored in the regressions that 
examine the size quartiles and the largest industries in the sample. Similarly, Pol_active, 
Lobbying, Contributions and Directors have no significant association with ROA. Firms with 
high sales growth and a large amount of capital expenditures are positively associated with ROA 
at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively), while higher leveraged firms are negatively associated 
with ROA (at the 1% level).  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
  Table 8 shows the models with a similar measure, ROE, as the dependent variable. 
However, none of the political connection variables of interest have a significant association with 
ROE. Interesting, Leverage is negatively associated with ROE (at the 1% level). This is likely 
due to the capital structure of the highly leveraged firms.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
V. Additional Testing  
 Table 9 re-runs the regressions with the main variable of interest, Pol_sum, and a one-
year lag on all the variables.
36
 The results using a one-year lag are almost identical to the results 
                                                          
36 
Pol_sum can also be chosen since it has the strongest results and, on average, marginally higher adjusted R². 
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with current year variables. The only change being that Pol_sum is slightly less positively 
significant with Tobin’s Q (5% vs. 1% previously).  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
  Table 10 breaks down the firms into four size quartiles (there are too many omitted 
variables in the regressions when examining quintiles
37
). This is done for two reasons: first 
several of the dependent variables are strongly correlated with Size. Untabluated results show 
that when separated into quartiles, the average correlation between Size and Pol_sum, Analysts, 
Tobin’s Q, ROA and ROE are 0.11, 0.16, -0.21, 0.24, 0.16 and 0.20, respectively. Second, several 
of the cross-listed firms are resource companies in the exploration stage and this helps study how 
these smaller firms may be affecting the results.  
   Table 10 shows that the largest cross-listed firms benefit the most from political 
connections, as both Analysts and Tobin’s Q are significantly associated with Pol_sum at the 1% 
level, while Volume is significantly associated with Pol_sum at the 5% level. Moreover, there is 
not a positive association between Pol_sum and ROA (at the 1% level). These results suggest that 
the biggest cross-listed firms benefit the most when also being politically connected. The results 
are also interesting when examining the second quartile. There is a significant positive 
association with Tobin’s Q (1% level), but a negative relationship with Analysts (10% level).  
Untabulated results show that it is a negative relationship between Directors and Analysts that is 
driving this result in the second quartile (this relationship is insignificant in the other quartiles). 
Furthermore, ROA and ROE have a significantly positive association with Pol_sum (at the 1% 
level). The third quartile shows a significant positive association with Tobin’s Q and Volume 
                                                          
37 For example, in quintiles all of the largest firms employ a big four auditor and none of the smallest firms pay 
dividends. 
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(1% level), but none of the other variables of interest are associated with Pol_sum. For the 
smallest firms, only Volume has a significant positive association with Pol_sum (5% level). 
However, ROA is negatively associated (10% level), which could possibly suggest the political 
connections could actually be detrimental to these smaller firms.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
  Tables 11 and 12 re-run the regressions for the two most populous industries in the 
sample (two digit SIC codes). Mining/resource companies (SIC 10-14) shows that all the prior 
relationships with Pol_sum are significant (1% level). However, ROA has no significant 
relationship and ROE is negative (at the 10% level). This appears to be a strong driver of the 
results (with many exploration stage companies having no revenue). Manufacturing companies 
(SIC 20-39) shows that Pol_sum is significantly positively associated with Analysts and Volume, 
but none of the other dependent variables.  
[Insert Table 11 here] 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
  Political connection may not be only enhancing the benefits of being cross-listed, but also 
providing benefits seen in the PCFs literature. Following Goldman et al. (2013), data on 
procurement contracts is collected from the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation 
(FPDS-NG). This database contains all procurement contracts that are awarded by the US 
government and exceed a value of $2,500. As these contracts are often multi-year, an indicator 
variable is used to measure whether a company was awarded a procurement contract in at least 
one year of the sample period. 25 firms (or approximately 21% of the sample) was award at least 
one procurement contracts during this time period. Table 13 presents the regressions with 
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Procurement as the dependent variable. The results show that the PCFs in the sample have a 
strong positive association (significant at the 1% level) with Procurement when regressed with 
Pol_sum and Pol_active. However, the third column shows that both lobbying and directors are 
not associated with Procurement, but it is the campaign Contributions that is the most significant 
factor for firms obtaining procurement contracts.  
[Insert Table 13 here] 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  Firms choose to cross-list for many reasons, such as increased liquidity, investor 
recognition, growth opportunities, and as part of a firm’s global strategy (Dodd, 2013). Likewise, 
political connections can enhance a firm’s reputation, decrease regulatory risk and lead to more 
profitable opportunities for firms (Faccio, 2006). This study asks whether being politically 
connected enhances the benefits of cross-listing. 
  The results show that compared to non-politically connected cross-listed firms, politically 
connected cross-listed firms have higher analysts following, higher market valuations, and higher 
liquidity. These benefits persist after a one-year lag and extend the most to the largest cross-
listed firms. While some PCFs may experience lower profitability, this is largely confined to the 
smaller, exploration type resources firms who would cross-list for other reasons (such as access 
to an increased amount of capital). Furthermore, additional analysis shows that politically 
connected cross-listed firms that contribute to political campaigns are significantly more like to 
obtain government procurement contracts. 
  This is one of the first studies to combine the political connectedness and cross-listed 
literatures. Although this study shows that there are benefits for cross-listed firms to also be 
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politically connected, there are limitations to this study. The decision for a firm to become either 
politically connected or cross-list is inherently endogenous. Thus, causality of when the benefits 
are extracted cannot be implied. Further studies can develop alternative models in order to 
demonstrate a stronger casual link.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A: Political Connections by firm-years 
Variable Mean 
(observations) 
Standard Deviation Average Spending 
(US dollars) 
Lobbying 0.157 (120) 0.364 $634,746 
CampaignContributions 0.154 (118) 0.361 $61,961 
PoliticalDirector 0.277 (212) 0.448  
 
Panel B: Political Connections by years 
Variable Mean 
(observations) 
Standard Deviation Average Spending 
(US dollars) 
2010    
Lobbying 0.144 (22) 0.352 $579,879 
CampaignContributions 0.157 (24) 0.365 $47,631 
PoliticalDirector 0.275 (42) 0.448  
 
2011 
   
Lobbying 0.163 (25) 0.371 $597,976 
CampaignContributions 0.157 (24) 0.365  
PoliticalDirector 0.281 (43) 0.451  
 
2012 
   
Lobbying 0.157 (24) 0.365 $656,837 
CampaignContributions 0.150 (23) 0.359 $83,146 
PoliticalDirector 0.281 (43) 0.451  
 
2013 
   
Lobbying 0.157 (24) 0.365 $629,767 
CampaignContributions 0.163 (25) 0.371  
PoliticalDirector 0.275 (42) 0.448  
 
2014 
   
Lobbying 0.163 (25) 0.371 $579,808 
CampaignContributions 0.144 (22) 0.352 $47,612 
PoliticalDirector 0.275 (42) 0.448  
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Panel C: Correlations Table 
 Lobbying CampaignContributions PoliticalDirector 
Lobbying 1   
CampaignContributions 0.5522* 1  
PoliticalDirector 0.1987* 0.2612* 1 
 
* Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Lobbying 0.157 0.369 0 1 
Contributions 0.154 0.373 0 1 
Directors 0.277 0.451 0 1 
Pol_sum 0.613 0.883 0 3 
Analysts 6.800 6.677 0 26.1 
Tobin’s Q 2.011 2.253 0.059 16.499 
Volume 18.430 1.773 13.749 21.741 
ROA 0.037 0.055 0 0.299 
ROE 0.013 0.112 0 2.338 
Size 7.211 2.658 1.477 13.530 
Big4 0.924 0.265 0 1 
Leverage 0.432 0.277 0.015 1.325 
Capexp 0.080 0.078 0 0.340 
Divs 0.425 0.495 0 1 
M&Aactivity 0.038 0.191 0 1 
Growth 0.237 0.930 -1 6.707 
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Table 3: Spearman Correlations Table 
 pol_sum 
 
analysts tobinq volume ROA ROE size big4  leverage capexp divs M&A growth 
pol_sum 
 
1.00             
analysts 0.51*** 1.00           
 
 
tobinq -0.06 0.11** 1.00          
 
 
volume 0.44*** 0.61*** 0.20*** 1.00         
 
 
ROA 0.22*** 0.35*** 0.07* 0.19*** 1.00        
 
 
ROE 0.28*** 0.33*** 0.09** 0.17*** 0.81** 1.00       
 
 
Size 0.62*** 0.73*** 
-0.32 
*** 0.74*** 0.40** 0.41*** 1.00       
big4 0.14*** 0.31*** -0.02 0.33*** 0.13** 0.14*** 0.34*** 1.00     
 
 
leverage 0.39*** 0.36*** -0.09** 0.19*** 0.11** 0.29*** 0.44*** 0.15*** 1.00    
 
 
capexp -0.06* 0.05 0.04 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.10** 0.13*** 0.09** 
-0.17 
*** 1.00    
Divs 0.53*** 0.58*** 
-0.12 
*** 0.52*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.75*** 0.25*** 0.36*** 0.13*** 1.00   
M&A -0.03 0.11** -0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.11** 
-0.12 
*** -0.04 1.00  
growth -0.05 0.01 0.18** 0.07** 0.27*** 0.20*** 0.06 0.08** 0.01 0.09* 0.05 0.08** 
 
1.00 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable definitions
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Table 4: Analysts Following 
 
Model: Analystsi,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Big4i,t + α4Leveragei,t + α5CapExpi,t +    
  α6Divsi,t + α7M&Aactivityi,t + α8Growthi,t + α9BKMKi,t + α10Lossi,t + α11Intangiblesi,t + 
  α12StockVolatilityi,t + α13StockReturni,t + industry&year effectsi,t + μ               
 
Variable 
 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Pol_sum 
0.887*** 
(3.63) 
  
Pol_active  
0.861** 
(1.97) 
 
Lobbying  
 1.084** 
(2.06) 
Contributions  
 2.876*** 
(5.13) 
Directors    
 -1.202** 
(-2.45) 
Size 
1.501*** 
(12.73) 
1.597*** 
(13.86) 
1.389*** 
(11.98) 
Big4 
0.224 
(0.35) 
0.064 
(0.10) 
0.149 
(0.24) 
Leverage 
-0.860 
(-1.50) 
-0.784 
(-1.36) 
-1.046* 
(-1.87) 
Capexp 
-5.127** 
(-2.22) 
-5.787** 
(-2.22) 
-5.127** 
(-2.33) 
Divs 
1.234*** 
(2.57) 
1.143** 
(2.35) 
1.687*** 
(3.57) 
M&Aactivity 
0.529 
(0.61) 
0.197 
(0.23) 
0.809 
(0.95) 
Growth 
-0.075 
(-1.41) 
-0.079 
(-1.46) 
-0.076 
(-1.47) 
BKMK 
-0.368 
(-1.67) 
-0.377 
(-1.70) 
-0.403* 
(-1.88) 
Loss 
0.237 
(0.61) 
0.291 
(0.74) 
0.219 
(0.58) 
 
Intangibles 
0.634 
(0.56) 
0.203 
(0.18) 
0.832 
(0.75) 
 
StockVolatility 
0.446*** 
(7.64) 
0.471*** 
(8.08) 
0.462*** 
(8.12) 
StockReturn 
-0.100 
(-1.08) 
-0.100 
(-1.07) 
-0.069 
(-0.76) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 710 710 710 
Adj. R² 0.6308 0.6258 0.6510 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable definitions  
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Table 5: Market Value 
 
Model: Tobin’s Qi,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Big4i,t + α4Leveragei,t + α5CapExpi,t 
+ α6Divsi,t + α7M&Aactivityi,t + α8Growthi,t + industry&year effectsi,t + μ 
Variable 
 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
Pol_sum 
0.445*** 
(3.49) 
  
Pol_active  
0.706*** 
(3.13) 
 
Lobbying  
 0.049 
(0.17) 
Contributions  
 0.788*** 
(2.57) 
Directors  
 0.485** 
(2.20) 
Size 
-0.695*** 
(-11.90) 
-0.673*** 
(-11.84) 
-0.694*** 
(-11.72) 
Big4 
0.371 
(1.08) 
0.344 
(1.00) 
0.368 
(1.07) 
Leverage 
1.470*** 
(4.85) 
1.492*** 
(4.91) 
1.460*** 
(4.81) 
Capexp 
4.278*** 
(3.85) 
4.175*** 
(3.42) 
4.311*** 
(3.53) 
Divs 
0.938*** 
(3.67) 
0.879*** 
(3.42) 
0.928*** 
(3.59) 
M&Aactivity 
-0.057 
(-0.13) 
-0.241 
(-0.53) 
-0.200 
(-0.43) 
Growth 
0.046 
(1.58) 
0.045 
(1.56) 
0.046 
(1.60) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 710 710 710 
Adj. R² 0.2766 0.2741 0.2769 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable definitions 
 
  
   
132 
 
Table 6: Liquidity 
 
Model: Volumei,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Big4i,t + α4Leveragei,t + α5CapExpi,t + 
α6Divsi,t + α7M&Aactivityi,t + α8Growthi,t + industry&year effectsi,t + μ 
Variable 
 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
Pol_sum 
0.183*** 
(2.96) 
  
Pol_active  
0.445*** 
(4.09) 
 
Lobbying  
 0.032 
(0.23) 
Contributions  
 0.249* 
(1.67) 
Directors  
 0.259** 
(2.42) 
Size 
0.520*** 
(18.33) 
0.514*** 
(18.77) 
0.524*** 
(18.24) 
Big4 
0.645*** 
(3.87) 
0.658*** 
(3.98) 
0.647*** 
(3.88) 
Leverage 
0.076 
(0.52) 
0.077 
(0.53) 
0.077 
(0.53) 
Capexp 
-0.716 
(-1.21) 
-0.682 
(-1.16) 
-0.701 
(-1.18) 
Divs 
-0.034 
(-0.27) 
-0.078 
(-0.63) 
-0.052 
(-0.41) 
M&Aactivity 
0.209 
(0.95) 
0.141 
(0.65) 
0.198 
(0.89) 
Growth 
0.026* 
(1.84) 
0.026* 
(1.88) 
0.026* 
(1.84) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 710 710 710 
Adj. R² 0.6374 0.6415 0.6373 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable definitions 
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Table 7: Return on Assets 
 
Model: ROAi,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Big4i,t + α4Leveragei,t + α5CapExpi,t + 
α6Divsi,t + α7M&Aactivityi,t + α8Growthi,t + industry&year effectsi,t + μ 
Variable 
 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
Pol_sum 
0.003 
(0.91) 
  
Pol_active  
-0.003 
(-0.45) 
 
Lobbying  
 -0.007 
(-0.98) 
Contributions  
 0.009 
(1.12) 
Directors  
 0.007 
(1.22) 
Size 
0.003* 
(1.67) 
0.003** 
(2.29) 
0.003* 
(1.78) 
Big4 
-0.008 
(-0.90) 
-0.009 
(-1.04) 
-0.008 
(-0.89) 
Leverage 
-0.031*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.030*** 
(-3.16) 
-0.031*** 
(-3.21) 
Capexp 
0.082** 
(2.48) 
0.077** 
(2.48) 
0.083** 
(2.51) 
Divs 
0.012* 
(2.48) 
0.012* 
(1.85) 
0.011 
(1.61) 
M&Aactivity 
-0.015 
(-1.28) 
-0.017 
(-1.42) 
-0.016 
(-1.33) 
Growth 
0.008*** 
(3.34) 
0.008*** 
(3.29) 
0.008*** 
(3.34) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 710 710 710 
Adj. R² 0.0982 0.0974 0.0990 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable definitions 
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Table 8: Return on Equity  
 
Model: ROEi,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Big4i,t + α4Leveragei,t + α5CapExpi,t + 
α6Divsi,t + α7M&Aactivityi,t + α8Growthi,t + industry&year effectsi,t + μ 
Variable 
 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
Pol_sum 
0.016 
(1.19)   
Pol_active  
0.013 
(0.052)  
Lobbying   
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
Contributions   
0.037 
(1.13) 
Directors   
0.013 
(0.53) 
Size 
-0.043*** 
(-6.86) 
-0.041*** 
(-6.75) 
-0.043*** 
(-6.80) 
Big4 
0.061 
(1.63) 
0.058 
(1.56) 
0.060 
(1.63) 
Leverage 
0.559*** 
(17.12) 
0.561*** 
(17.18) 
0.558*** 
(17.06) 
Capexp 
0.368** 
(2.50) 
0.318** 
(2.42) 
0.330** 
(2.51) 
Divs 
0.053* 
(1.91) 
0.052* 
(1.87) 
0.053* 
(1.92) 
M&Aactivity 
-0.034 
(-0.70) 
-0.042 
(-0.86) 
-0.033 
(-0.68) 
Growth 
0.005 
(1.52) 
0.005 
(1.49) 
0.005 
(1.52) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 710 710 710 
Adj. R² 0.3404 0.3394 0.3390 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable definitions 
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Table 9: One Year Lagged Effects: 
 
Model: DVi,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t-1 + α2Sizei,t-1+ α3Big4i,t-1 + α4Leveragei,t-1 + α5CapExpi,t-1 
+ α6Divsi,t-1 + α7M&Aactivityi,t-1 + α8Growthi,t-1 + industry&year effectsi,t-1 + μ 
Variable 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
DV= 
Analysts 
DV= 
Tobin’s Q 
DV= Trade 
Volume 
DV = ROA DV = ROE 
Pol_sum 
1.442*** 
(5.25) 
0.358** 
(2.53) 
0.197*** 
(2.89) 
0.003 
(0.63) 
0.024 
(1.09) 
Size 
1.627*** 
(12.86) 
-0.660*** 
(-10.11) 
0.504*** 
(16.03) 
0.001 
(0.73) 
-0.011 
(-0.61) 
Big4 
0.379 
(0.51) 
0.346 
(0.97) 
0.612*** 
(3.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.112 
(1.10) 
Leverage 
-1.068* 
(-1.69) 
0.935*** 
(2.87) 
0.132 
(0.84) 
-0.021 
(-2.31) 
0.438*** 
(5.03) 
Capexp 
-2.662 
(-1.04) 
3.065** 
(2.31) 
0.321 
(0.50) 
0.079** 
(2.06) 
0.480 
(1.35) 
Divs 
1.648*** 
(2.93) 
1.073*** 
(3.69) 
-0.028 
(-0.20) 
0.009* 
(1.19) 
0.109 
(1.41) 
M&Aactivity 
0.925 
(0.91) 
-0.030 
(-0.06) 
0.455* 
(1.80) 
-0.025* 
(-1.82) 
0.011 
(0.07) 
Growth 
-0.078 
(-1.36) 
0.007 
(0.24) 
0.022 
(1.57) 
-0.001 
(-1.32) 
-0.008 
(-1.00) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 568 568 568 568 568 
Adj. R² 0.6153 0.2566 0.6406 0.0826 0.2394 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable definitions 
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Table 10: Size Deciles 
 
Model: DVi,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Big4i,t + α4Leveragei,t + α5CapExpi,t + 
α6Divsi,t + α7M&Aactivityi,t + α8Growthi,t + industry&year effectsi,t + μ 
Quartile 1 (Largest Firms) 
Variable 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
DV= 
Analysts 
DV= 
Tobin’s Q 
DV= Trade 
Volume 
DV = ROA DV = ROE 
Pol_sum 
2.435*** 
(5.95) 
0.086*** 
(2.68) 
0.143** 
(2.48) 
0.008*** 
(3.00) 
0.007 
(0.98) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 177 177 177 177 177 
Adj. R² 0.4023 0.4235 0.5198 0.4040 0.2358 
 
Quartile 2 
Variable 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
DV= 
Analysts 
DV= 
Tobin’s Q 
DV= Trade 
Volume 
DV = ROA DV = ROE 
Pol_sum 
-0.895* 
(-1.69) 
0.264*** 
(3.62) 
0.014 
(0.14) 
0.020** 
(3.38) 
0.025*** 
(2.69) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 
Adj. R² 0.3647 0.2965 0.4495 0.1504 0.1703 
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Quartile 3 
Variable 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
DV= 
Analysts 
DV= 
Tobin’s Q 
DV= Trade 
Volume 
DV = ROA DV = ROE 
Pol_sum 
0.939 
(1.33) 
0.813*** 
(3.62) 
1.281*** 
(4.15) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
-0.112 
(-1.30) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 177 177 177 177 177 
Adj. R² 0.5512 0.2485 0.2709 0.0732 0.0782 
 
Quartile 4 (Smallest Firms) 
Variable 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
DV= 
Analysts 
DV= 
Tobin’s Q 
DV= Trade 
Volume 
DV = ROA DV = ROE 
Pol_sum 
0.088 
(0.21) 
1.480 
(1.62) 
0.663** 
(2.24) 
-0.031* 
(-1.75) 
-0.483 
(-0.31) 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 178 178 178 178 178 
Adj. R² 0.3532 0.3267 0.2823 0.0345 0.0841 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable definitions 
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Table 11: Mining/Resource Companies (SIC 10-14) 
 
Model: DVi,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Big4i,t + α4Leveragei,t + α5CapExpi,t + 
α6Divsi,t + α7M&Aactivityi,t + α8Growthi,t + year effectsi,t + μ 
Variable 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Variable 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
DV= 
Analysts 
DV= 
Tobin’s Q 
DV= Trade 
Volume 
DV = ROA DV = ROE 
Pol_sum 
1.923*** 
(5.44) 
0.609*** 
(4.80) 
0.290*** 
(2.67) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
-0.051* 
(1.82) 
Size 
1.848*** 
(10.86) 
-0.410*** 
(-6.72) 
0.588*** 
(11.26) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
0.040** 
(2.13) 
Big4 
-0.573 
(-0.78) 
1.078*** 
(4.09) 
0.474** 
(2.10) 
-0.011 
(-0.99) 
-0.149* 
(-1.85) 
Leverage 
-1.598 
(-1.34) 
-0.490 
(-1.14) 
-1.177*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.019 
(-1.07) 
-0.351*** 
(-2.68) 
Capexp 
-7.229*** 
(-3.23) 
0.913 
(1.14) 
-0.866 
(-1.26) 
0.073** 
(2.09) 
0.450* 
(1.83) 
Divs 
2.020*** 
(3.33) 
0.360* 
(1.66) 
-0.012 
(-0.07) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.087 
(1.31) 
M&Aactivity 
0.675 
(0.32) 
0.220 
(0.29) 
0.851 
(1.32) 
0.018 
(0.19) 
0.106 
(0.46) 
Growth 
-0.083* 
(-1.69) 
-0.016 
(-0.91) 
0.014 
(0.97) 
0.001 
(0.31) 
0.001 
(0.20) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 
Adj. R² 0.6581 0.2866 0.5570 0.0820 0.0859 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable definitions 
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Table 12: Manufacturing Companies (SIC 20-39) 
Model: DVi,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Big4i,t + α4Leveragei,t + α5CapExpi,t + 
α6Divsi,t + α7M&Aactivityi,t + α8Growthi,t + year effectsi,t + μ 
Variable 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Variable 
 
OLS 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
 
DV= 
Analysts 
DV= 
Tobin’s Q 
DV= Trade 
Volume 
DV = ROA DV = ROE 
Pol_sum 
1.792*** 
(3.64) 
0.481 
(1.45) 
0.321*** 
(2.65) 
0.009 
(1.21) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
Size 
1.733*** 
(8.37) 
-0.975*** 
(-6.98) 
0.590*** 
(11.58) 
0.008** 
(2.58) 
0.099*** 
(2.62) 
Big4 
1.532 
(0.94) 
-2.576** 
(-2.34) 
1.001** 
(2.50) 
-0.021 
(-0.89) 
-0.340 
(-1.14) 
Leverage 
0.104 
(0.11) 
0.900 
(1.41) 
0.122 
(0.52) 
-0.031 
(-1.64) 
0.688*** 
(3.96) 
Capexp 
5.256 
(0.76) 
23.196*** 
(4.99) 
0.870 
(0.51) 
0.095 
(0.91) 
-0.397 
(-0.31) 
Divs 
-1.382 
(-1.28) 
0.881 
(1.21) 
-0.808*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.013 
(-0.82) 
0.069 
(0.35) 
M&Aactivity 
0.263 
(0.18) 
0.647 
(0.64) 
0.156 
(0.43) 
-0.030 
(-1.42) 
-0.215 
(-0.79) 
Growth 
0.123 
(0.42) 
0.650*** 
(3.27) 
0.194*** 
(2.68) 
0.013** 
(2.34) 
0.061 
(1.12) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 195 195 195 195 195 
Adj. R² 0.5680 0.4108 0.6518 0.1004 0.2478 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable definitions 
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Table 13: Procurement Contracts 
 
Model: Procurementi,t = α0 + α1PCF measurei,t + α2Sizei,t + α3Big4i,t + α4Leveragei,t + 
α5CapExpi,t + α6Divsi,t + α7M&Aactivityi,t + α8Growthi,t + industry&year effectsi,t + μ 
 
Variable 
 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
OLS Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Pol_sum 
0.057*** 
(3.01)   
Pol_active  
0.168*** 
(5.04)  
Lobbying   
0.002 
(0.05) 
Contributions   
0.154*** 
(3.40) 
Directors       
0.016 
(0.48) 
Size 
0.056*** 
(6.47) 
0.052*** 
(6.30) 
0.054*** 
(6.16) 
Big4 
-0.149*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.139*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.151*** 
(-2.97) 
Leverage 
0.010 
(0.22) 
0.010 
(0.23) 
0.005 
(0.10) 
Capexp 
-0.236 
(-1.30) 
-0.226 
(-1.27) 
-0.233 
(-1.29) 
Divs 
-0.123*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.154*** 
(-4.07) 
-0.123*** 
(-3.22) 
M&Aactivity 
0.089 
(1.32) 
0.068 
(1.02) 
0.097 
(1.43) 
Growth 
-0.002 
(-0.43) 
-0.002 
(-0.38) 
-0.002 
(-0.44) 
Industry Effects YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES 
Observations 710 710 710 
Adj. R² 0.3493 0.3641 0.3528 
 
*** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
See Appendix I for variable definitions 
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Appendix I: Variable Definitions 
 
Lobbying- indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has lobbying expenditures 
Contributions- indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has campaign contributions 
Directors- indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a politician director 
Pol_sum- Summation of Lobbying, CampaignContribution and PoliticalDirector 
Active- whether the firm had at least one year of Lobbying, CampaignContribution or 
PoliticalDirector in the sample period 
Analysts- the number of analysts following a company in a given year 
Tobin’s Q- the ratio of the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets 
Volume- log of the yearly total trading volume of the firm’s stock 
ROA- return on assets, calculated as net profit divided by total assets 
ROE- return on equity, calculated as net profit divided by total shareholder’s equity 
Size- log of total firm assets 
Big4- indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a big four auditor 
Leverage- calculated as total liabilities over total assets  
CapExp- capital expenditures, calculated as total capital expenditures divided by total assets 
Divs- indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm paid out dividends in the year  
M&Aactivity- indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm had a mergers and acquisitions event  
Growth- year-over-year sales growth, calculated as yearly change in revenue divided by previous 
year’s revenue 
BKMK- Book-to-market, calculated as the book value of equity, excluding preferred shares, 
divided by the market value of the firm on the balance sheet date 
Loss- indicator variable with a value of one if the firm had a net loss in the year 
Intangibles- intangible assets, calculated as intangible assets divided by total assets 
StockVolatility- the standard deviation of a firm’s stock in the prior year 
StockReturn- the return of a firm’s stock in the prior year 
Procurement- indicator variable equal to 1 if firm was granted a procurement contract during the 
sample period 
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Chapter 5:  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The previous chapters in this dissertation were motivated by large scale corporate 
governance failures (e.g. Enron, WorldCom), increased calls from stakeholders to improve 
governance practices, and new rules and regulations, such as 2010’s Citizens United v. FEC— 
which essentially allows corporations to unlimitedly contribute to political campaigns. Each of 
the three essays in this dissertation provide valuable insights into these issues by investigating 
the associations between corporate governance, accounting quality, financial performance, 
interlocked board structures, cross-listed firms as well as politically connected firms and 
directors. 
  The first essay developed a proxy disclosure score and employs accruals models to proxy 
for earnings quality. The results show board interlocks have a negative relationship with 
governance disclosures and overall corporate governance quality, but a positive effect on 
earnings quality. Supplemental analysis demonstrates that there is no association between board 
interlocks and simple or basic voluntary disclosures, but there is a strong negative relationship 
between board interlocks and corporate governance (policies and practices) disclosures. 
  The second essay performed a large scale textual analysis on company proxy statements 
and documented the prevalence of politicians joining corporate boards. Results from the study 
showed that politicians as board directors are associated with higher corporate governance 
scores. This relationship persists after controlling for firm-level, performance, and other 
governance based variables. The results also imply that adding a politician to a board of directors 
increases the firm’s corporate governance quality.  
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  Finally, the third essay examined nearly the entire population of Canadian firms which 
were cross-listed in the U.S. It documents that while political connections are on the same level 
as U.S. firms, political connections enhance the benefits of cross-listing for Canadian cross-listed 
firms. Specifically, cross-listed firms which are also politically connected benefit through higher 
analyst following, higher market valuations, greater market liquidity, and are more likely to 
receive procurement contracts than their cross-listed counterparts. 
  Overall, the three essays in this dissertation expand the extant literature in the areas of 
board of directors’ composition, corporate governance, cross-listed corporations and politically 
connected firms. Although the findings presented here do have some limitations. Corporate 
governance research is inherently endogenous, whereby faulty conclusions about theoretical 
propositions can be a problem. Each of the essays employs a number of additional tests- from 
endogeneity to robustness to sensitivity analyses. However, econometric problems such as 
omitted variables, reverse causation and serial correlation may still be present. Thus, the results 
should only be interpreted as presented. Future research may utilize these findings and further 
expand on the analyses by longer time series models, conducting natural experiments, or 
applying the methodology to different jurisdictions around the world. 
 
